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Abstract
Train derailments can result in loss of life, interruption of services, and destruction of the
environment. Understanding the correlates of train derailments can help railway
managers and safety managers reduce the occurrences of train derailments. Grounded in
the Swiss cheese model, the purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to
examine the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather,
number of crew members, crew members’ length of time on duty, and the occurrence of a
train derailment. Data were collected from secondary data on 1,396 Class I and Class II
railroad accidents during the 2019 calendar year. The results of the binomial logistic
regression were statistically significant, X2(12, N = 1396) = 114.265, p < .001.
Nonoperator causal factors and the number of crew members on duty were statistically
significant predictors of the occurrence of a train derailment. A key recommendation for
railway managers is to adjust preventative maintenance measures and increase the
number of crew members on duty. The implications for positive social change include
potentially reducing the frequency of train derailments and saving lives.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Human factors can have major contributions to accidents across various industries
including railway, aviation, maritime, and mining (Li et al., 2019). Human factors and
nonhuman factors are causes of train derailment (Liu et al., 2013). Though these errors
can cause catastrophic outcomes, understanding the causes of error can provide the
knowledge to help eliminate these errors (Underwood & Waterson, 2013). For example,
when snowy and icy weather occurs, the likelihood of accident occurrence is four times
higher (Malin et al., 2019). The objective of this study was to help railway managers
understand the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather,
number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of
train derailment.
Background of the Problem
Train derailments can result in the loss of life or property, interruption of services,
and destruction of the environment (Liu et al., 2013). They are the most frequent kind of
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) reportable mainline train accident in the United
States (Barkan, et al., 2003). There are four main causes for train derailment: (a)
operations and human mistakes, (b) track failures, (c) factors regarding to rolling stock
and (d) environmental and natural catastrophes (Mohammadzadeh & Ghahremani, 2012).
In the FRA Safety Office of Safety Analysis database, the train accident codes can be
further broken down into specific causes that influenced the occurrence of train
derailments.
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Train derailment severity is a key factor in understanding the outcome of a train
derailment and its impact (Martey & Attoh-Okine, 2019). Derailment severity has been
influenced by multiple causal factors, which include car mass, derailment speed, residual
train length, derailment cause, ground friction, proportion of loaded railcars in the train,
and train power distribution (Zakar & Mueller, 2016). Train derailment severity can also
be impacted by visibility, weather, number of crew on duty, and crew member length of
time on duty, which were researched in this study. The topic of train derailment is
important because the findings may allow management and employees in the railroad
industry to understand the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility,
weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and the
occurrence of train derailment. Knowing this information can help management and
safety managers understand how to reduce occurrences of train derailments.
Problem Statement
Since 2016, there have been over 4,000 train derailments in the United States,
resulting in over 248 million dollars’ worth of loss (FRA, 2019). Train derailments have
decreased by 5.9% each year but continue to have impact on the on-track equipment,
signals, track, track structures, supply chain, employees, and railbed (Liu et al., 2017).
The general business problem is that train derailments, sometimes the results of operator
error, have an impact on community safety, transportation efficiency, and organizational
cost. The specific business problem is that some railway managers do not understand the
relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew
members, crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew
members, crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
The independent variables were train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather,
number of crew members, and crew members length of time on duty. The dependent
variable was the occurrence of train derailment, represented as a dichotomous variable.
The targeted sample population consisted of Class I and Class II rail lines in the railroad
industry across the United States. Data collection was completed through the FRA Office
of Safety Analysis, which is a publicly available database. All derailment safety reports
are reported and complied on this site. The implications for social change include the
potential to reduce the frequency of train derailment occurrences in the railroad industry
and save lives.
Nature of the Study
I used the quantitative method to examine the relationship between the identified
independent and dependent variables. Quantitative researchers identify changes in
numerical characteristics of the population being studied and examine statistical
relationships between variables (Paul & Garg, 2014), which was the purpose of this
study. In contrast, by using the qualitative approach, researchers usually derive themes
from the subjective answers of the research participants (Yin, 2018). A mixed methods
study contains the attributes of both quantitative and qualitative methods (Guetterman et
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al., 2015). Since the intent of my study was to identify the relationship between variables,
the qualitative and mixed-method approaches were not appropriate.
I used the quantitative method with a correlational design to investigate the
relationship between five independent variables and one dependent variable. Using the
correlational design approach, researchers can examine the direction and strength of the
relationship between the predictor/independent variables and criterion/dependent
variables (Curtis et al., 2015). Experimental design includes many of the same elements
of a quasi-experimental design, but with quasi-experimental design there is no random
selection of the secondary participants for control or experimental groups (Jaffee et al.,
2012). The quasi-experimental or experimental research design is used when identifying
and assessing the causes that influence outcomes (Creswell, 2009). For this study, my
objective was to examine the relationship between variables within the real world without
controls. Therefore, the experimental and quasi-experimental designs were not
appropriate for my study.
Research Question
What is the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility,
weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and the
occurrence of train derailment?
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between train derailment
causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members length of
time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
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Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between train derailment causal
factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on
duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
Theoretical Framework
James Reason’s (1990) Swiss cheese model suggests that longstanding
organizational deficiencies can create the necessary conditions for a frontline active
failure to trigger an accident (Underwood & Waterson, 2014). Layers of defense are like
a slice of Swiss cheese with the potential to have holes or weaknesses (Olson & Raz,
2021). When the holes in a system’s defenses align, an accident trajectory can pass
through the defensive layers and result in a hazard causing harm to people, assets, and the
environment (Reason, 2008). Holes in a single slice or defense will not normally cause a
bad outcome, but when all the holes momentarily align, that is when a failure has a clear
path through the system, resulting in a catastrophic accident (Reason, 1997). These holes
are also changing in sizes and location at any given time. Additionally, these holes can be
looked at as latent and active errors. Latent errors are the results of organizational system
or design failures that will allow active errors to happen and cause harm (Collins et al.,
2014). Active errors are the results of an individual’s failure and occur at the point of
contact between a human and an aspect of a larger system (Collins et al., 2014). Both
latent and active errors impact the chances of an accident to occur and are both equally
important when understanding what caused an accident to occur.
The variables in this study were train derailment causal factors, visibility,
weather, number of crew members, and crew members length of time on duty. Each of
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these variables can be looked at as a slice of cheese. Further, Reason looked at four levels
that are present within sociotechnical systems: unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts,
supervisory factors, and organizational influences. Each variable in this study can fall
into one of these categories as they all have impact on the likelihood of an accident to
occur. With this study, the goal was to determine the relationship between train
derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members
length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
Operational Definitions
Class I railroad: A Class I railroad is based on the annual operation revenue and
has a threshold of revenue greater than $250 million (Code of Federal Regulation [CFR],
2018).
Class II railroad: A Class II railroad is based on the annual operational revenue
and has a threshold of revenue less than $250 million but in excess of $20 million (CFR,
2018).
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA): The FRA compiles all train derailment
reports received from around the United States that exceed a monetary threshold of
damage costs and include items such as total damage costs, number of cars derailed, track
type, train length, derailment speed, and other impacting variables (Liu et al., 2013).
Nonoperator causal factors: Nonoperator causal factors could include (a) track,
roadbed, and structure (roadbed, track geometry, rail joint bar and rail anchoring, frog,
switches and track appliances, other way and structure), (b) signal and communication
(signal and communication codes), (c) mechanical and electrical failures (brakes, trailer
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or container on flatcar, body, coupler and draft system, track components, axles and
journal bearings, wheels, locomotives, doors, general mechanical electrical failures), (d)
miscellaneous causes not otherwise listed (environmental conditions, loading procedures,
high-way grade crossing accidents, unusual operational situations, and other
miscellaneous; FRA, 2019).
Operator causal factors: Operator causal factors are train operation human
factors, which can include (a) use of brakes, (b) employee physical condition, (c) hand
and radio signals, (d) general switching rules, (e) main track authority, (f) train
handling/train make-up, (g) speed, (h) use of switch, (i) cab signals, and (j) other
miscellaneous codes (FRA, 2019).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Assumptions are unverified opinions that researchers hold while conducting their
study (Roy & Pacuit, 2012). The first assumption in this study was that railroads are
reporting all train derailments according to their rail class and including the necessary
details within each report. Each accident report should include over 50 different variables
with each providing different input into the railroad train derailment report analysis (Liu
et al., 2017). The second assumption was that all information within the FRA of Safety
Analysis Office database can be broken down into the correct causal code for the train
derailment. The final assumption was that all information entered in the database on
weather, visibility, number of crew members, and crew members length of time on duty
was entered correctly by the accident recorder.
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Limitations
Limitations refer to potential weaknesses of the study that are not within the
control of the research but can be further researched by others once the limitations are
identified within the study (Simon, 2011). One limitation in the database was that there
are only two sections for causal code entry and there might be more than just the primary
causal code and contributing causal code that made the train derailment occur. The
second limitation was that there are potentially additional causes that are not adequately
captured by the list of options within the database. The final limitation was that each
independent variable (train derailment causal factors (human or nonhuman), visibility,
weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty) in the FRA
database is entered by the accident recorder, and there could be incorrect information
recorded.
Delimitations
Delimitations refer to the bounds or scope of the study that are within the control
of the researchers (Patton, 2014). One delimitation was my focus on Class I and Class II
railroads. This was a delimitation because within the CFRs 49, Title 49, Part 1201 there
are other classes of railroad Class III–Class VIIII, which each fall into different annual
operation revenue thresholds (CFR, 2018). The second delimitation was the selection of
the United States as the area of data collection for train derailment analysis.
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Significance of the Study
Contribution to Business Practice
One common metric for assessing rail safety is accident rate, which can be
defined as the number of train accidents normalized by traffic exposure, such as train
miles, car miles, gross ton-miles, or passenger miles (Liu, 2015). Derailments are the
most common type of train accident in the United States and can cause damage to
infrastructure, rolling stock, and lading; disrupt service; and have the potential to cause
casualties and harm to the environment (Liu et al., 2017). The findings from this study
will provide information to railway managers to help to better understand and prevent
train derailments, because they will understand the relative importance of the different
factors on the potential outcomes. Finally, for the nonoperator causal factors, for instance
with weather, informed decisions can be made on resource allocation to prevent potential
issues.
Implications for Social Change
The impacts for positive social change include giving management the
understanding of the relative importance of the elements of operator causal and
nonoperator causal factors. There is also the potential for managers to understand the
unforeseen accident causal factors for train derailments. Improving operator and
managers awareness of train derailment causal factors can help to improve the safety
measures occurring during and after a train derailment. Finally, management will be able
to analyze causal factors for information disseminate to the community on train
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derailment safety precautions, which in turn may increase public awareness on disaster
prevention.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the relationship
between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members,
crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. The
theoretical framework for this study was James Reason’s (1990) Swiss cheese model. For
the literature review, I searched EBSCO host, ProQuest, Thoreau multidata base, and
Google Scholar for all articles related in the topic areas of aviation accidents, aviation
accident by human error, maritime accidents, human error maritime, train accident
human error, accidents in aviation, accidents in maritime, accidents in railway, accidents
in oil field, aviation accident causes, maritime accident causes, railway accident causes,
nonhuman error in organizational accidents, medical accidents, human error in
accidents, accident occurrence through error, train derailment, train safety, causal
factors, operator error, risk management, organizational accident, accident causation,
the swiss cheese model, man-machine-environment, 3M model, 5M model, hot cheese
model, linkage to swiss cheese model, updated swiss cheese model, accidents in multiple
sectors, common occurrences in accidents, derailment causes, weather, weather
accidents, visibility, crew members, accident factors, human error causes for accidents,
nonhuman accident causes, and industry accident causes. I also obtained data from the
FRA Safety of Safety Analysis database pertaining to the occurrence of train derailments
and the causes of those train derailments. The review of literature includes 141
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references. Eighty-three percent of the references were published within the past 5 years
(2017–2021), and 90% are peer-reviewed.
In this literature review, I first discuss organizational accidents, including accident
occurrence in multiple industries and accident causation. Next, I discuss the theoretical
framework for this study, including the origins of the Swiss cheese model, the
development and the evolution of this model, and the model’s components followed by
supporting and contrasting theories. Additionally, I review the literature related to
accidents within the aviation, maritime, and railroad industry. Finally, I conclude the
literature review with an analysis of the implications of this study for business practice
related to train derailments.
Organizational Accidents
Accident Occurrence Across Industries
In a number of industries, the occurrence of accidents is high when dealing with
human error or nonhuman errors (Erjavac et al., 2018). Currently, an estimated 60% to
80% of system failures from aviation, railway, and maritime areas are attributable to
human performance (Erjavac et al., 2018). In each industry, researchers are looking to
further understand the role of employees in complying with safety standards and also
ensure that employees have the decision-making skills to handle sudden situations that
could create an accident.
Across sectors, there are a number of areas where human error can come into play
when an accident occurs. Human error within the aviation field means actions associated
with the pilots, cabin crew members, navigators, meteorologists, mechanics, and
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constructors (Ding et al., 2019). In the maritime sector, human error often includes
navigator error or inappropriate behaviors (Youn et al., 2018). Finally, in the railway
sector, human error often includes accidents that occurred due to operator error (Sun et
al., 2020). Besides the human element, there is also the chance of nonhuman occurrences
such as those caused by glitches within the system (Strauss, 2017). Across sectors, human
error can encompass intentional or unintentional violation of procedures, or
organizational influences from a managerial level (Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019).
Accident Causation
When an accident occurs in a system, one way to discover the causes is to
complete an analysis using accident causation theories and models (Li et al., 2017).
Accident causation analysis can help companies find the common patterns within the
failures to help reduce or sometimes prevent the occurrence of the accident happening
again. Over time, numerous methods have been developed, but structural decomposition
and functional abstraction are the two most viable for understanding accident causation.
Structural decomposition takes a system, breaks it down into objects, and explains the
causal factors for the object’s failure (Li et al., 2017). This method is most commonly
used to analyze and break into categories the failures that occurred within a system.
Functional abstraction deals with analyzing the functional relationships within a system
to understand the behaviors that occur within the system.
When discussing accident causation models and theories, two models (3M and
5M) are used to further analyze the system safety factors, which deal with man, machine,
and environment. The first adopted version of the man, machine, and environment model,
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referred to as the 3M model, created by Professor Long in 1981, was used to show that
there is not a single causal factor when dealing with equipment failure (Guo et al., 2019).
The 3M model can be seen in Figure 1, but it has been updated over time to include more
factors that could be causing frequent accidents to occur.
Figure 1
Man-Machine-Environment (3M) Model

Note. From “Application of Man-Machine-Environment System Engineering in Coal
Mines Safety Management,” by S. Xiaoyan, and X. Zhongpeng, 2014, Procedia
Engineering, 84, p. 88 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2014.10.413).
Both the 3M and 5M model help to first create a picture of the potential reasons
for the accident to occur (Xiaoyan & Zhongpeng, 2014). The first step in accident
causation analysis is to understand the different variables that can have an impact of the
potential outcome for an accident to occur. Over time, the 3M was expanded to include
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variables that were not thought of when the model was first created. To expand on the
3M model, the 5M model was created, which includes the following variables: man,
machine, media, management, and mission. Expansion of the 3M to the 5M helped to
show other areas that need to be understood on the impact they have to the creation of
accidents in multiple environments. With each iteration of the models the figure changes
to streamline the overall impact of the creation of the new model.
There is an overlap within the 5M model that includes mission and management,
which is depicted in Figure 2. The 5M and 3M models are important to help accident
research analyst understand the potential factors that had an impact on the occurrences of
accidents across multiple industries. Researchers have also proposed another version of
the 5M model that evaluated the impact of human, process, and technology factors on
system failures (Irani et al., 2017). The variables were expanded to include other
variables that have a key role in the accident causation that occurs after a failure in a
system. Although all factors might not act together, more than one factor can be causing
the accident or failure within a system.
Figure 2
5M Model
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Note. From “An Accident Causation Analysis and Taxonomy (ACAT) Model of
Complex Industrial System from Both System Safety and Control Theory Perspectives,”
by W. Li, L. Zhang and W. Liang, 2017, Safety Science, 92, p. 97
(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.001).
Although the 3M and 5M model help to show how each safety factor can create
the perfect opportunity for accidents to occur within a system, the Swiss cheese model is
still one of the leading models used when looking at accident causation. Accident
causation is a factor in understanding how Reason came to develop the Swiss cheese
model (Liu et al., 2017). Reason was more focused on the latent, active, and defenses that
exist within a system to cause an accident to occur.
The Swiss Cheese Model
Creating the Swiss Cheese Model
Reason (1997) created the Swiss cheese model after placing cat food into a teapot
instead of the cat bowl, which led to modeling organizational accidents and the
foundation to the Swiss cheese model (see Figure 3). The question was raised as to which
defenses failed, how did they fail, and why did they fail, defenses, barriers, and
safeguards (Peltomaa, 2012). In this model, Reason was looking to understand how
organizational factors, local workplace factors, and unsafe acts impact the defenses that
are currently in place within an organization. The defenses that are in place need to be
strong enough to withstand the factors that could come to break down the efficiency in an
organization and to create a layered effect to the defensive layer in a system (Bode &
Vraga, 2021).
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Figure 3
Model of Organizational Accidents

Note. From Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, by J. Reason, 1997,
Ashgate Publishing.
Figure 4 shows the early edition of Reason’s Swiss cheese model, which focused
on decision makers, line management, preconditions, productive activities, and defenses.
The Swiss cheese model was established as a reference model in the causation,
investigation, and understanding, and prevention of organization accidents (Larouzee &
Le Coze, 2020).
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Figure 4
Early Edition of James Reason’s Model

Note. From “Good and Bad Reason: The Swiss Cheese Model and Its Critics,” by J.
Larouzee, and J. C. Le Coze, 2020, Safety Science, 126, p. 5
(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2020.104660).
The Swiss cheese model also includes active failures, latent failures, and defenses.
Active failures are looked at as unsafe acts by front-end operators, which includes errors,
mistakes, and violations. Latent failures are gaps or weaknesses in the system safety
defenses that were implemented into the creation of the system. Latent failures, unlike
active failures, can lay dormant or undetected for hours, days, weeks, or even longer,
until one day they adversely affect the system, which creates the failure (Wiegmann et al,
2021). The layers of defense can be looked at as the holes in Swiss cheese that can be the
weaknesses within the system. Holes or weaknesses in a single slice or defense do not
normally result in a catastrophic outcome, but when all the holes align, any failure has a
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clear path through the system, with the potential to result in a catastrophic accident
(Reason, 1997).
Since the creation of the Swiss cheese model, it has been adopted by many
industries including aviation, nursing, health care and medical, nuclear, chemical
processing, oil and gas, and rail. The most widely used theory for accident causation in
various industries is the Swiss cheese model (Waterson et al., 2017). The Swiss cheese
model is used in risk analysis and risk management, including aviation safety,
engineering, health care, and emergency organization, and as the principle behind layered
security (Karimi et al., 2021).
In the aviation sector, the Swiss cheese model has been used to help identify the
human and organizational factors that contributed to the occurrence of a general aviation
accident (Xue & Fu, 2018). For instance, 70–80% of civil and military aviation accidents
are caused by human error (Shappelll & Wiegmann, 2001). The Swiss cheese model can
be used in the aviation sector to help understand the potential unsafe acts, unsafe
conditions, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, deficiencies in the
general aviation safety management, and deficiencies in safety culture (Xue & Fu, 2018).
The variables in this model are taken from the Swiss cheese model and are used to
understand how human and organizational factors impact the likelihood of an accident to
be caused.
The health care industry has used the Swiss cheese model to mold the model to a
specific accident that occurred and connect the holes to show how it created the perfect
alignment for an accident to occur (Seshia et al., 2017). For example, a surgical error may
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occur due to the following factors that created the perfect alignment for the accident to
occur: incorrect site on consent, first day at the new hospital, new equipment never
inserviced, band used instead of marking, video transition down had to use pheon, family
does not speak English, history and physical examination not verified with consent,
which resulted in the wrong site surgery. Each of these factors represent the holes that
created the failures in the barriers (Seshia et al., 2017). Though the Swiss cheese model
has a simplified version, in the health care industry this model can be tailored to show
where there were holes in the barrier, creating an increased likelihood for an accident to
occur. The Swiss cheese model can help health care professionals understand the safety
measures that need to be put into place (Wiegmann et al., 2021).
The Swiss cheese model has also been used within the railroad industry to
understand how inadequate defenses, unsafe acts, psychological precursors of unsafe
acts, line management deficiencies, and fallible decisions can have an impact on the
occurrence of a train accident (Suryoputro et al., 2015). Within each variable, there could
be issues that occurred and created the perfect alignment of the hole to cause the accident
to occur. For instance, psychological precursors of unsafe acts could include poorly
coordinated communication, physical and mental fatigue, and feeling unwell. When one
factor within each layer of the Swiss cheese model fails, it creates the perfect opening for
a train accident to occur.
Human error is inevitable, and it is impossible for humans to fully eliminate error
(Reason, 1995). Because errors occur, there is a need for systems to be able to handle the
potential error. Human error can be looked at as a potential consequence rather than a

20
cause and blaming operators for the occurrence of the error or accident does not improve
safety prevention. Looking at the traditional model for accident causation that focused on
active failures (human errors and mistakes) and single causes is inadequate (Xia et al.,
2018). When creating the organizational accident theory, Reason focused on how
organizational accidents are catastrophic events that occur in complex systems that
involve many people at different levels (Reason, 1997). The Swiss cheese model was
classified as an epidemiological model because of the suggestion that standing defects
within a system can create the ideal conditions for active failures to trigger an accident to
occur (Underwood & Waterson, 2014).
Evolution of the Swiss Cheese Model
The Swiss cheese model was first introduced in 1987 when Reason was exploring
human error. From this, Reason published the seminal book, Human Error (Reason,
1990). While researching human error, Reason was able to find the differences between
active errors and latent errors. Reason (1990) concluded that active errors, which are
performed by operators, can be influenced by the conditions that exist within the
organization, which are known as latent errors. Latent errors can be looked at as dormant
errors that can be active when combined with other factors creating a breach in the
defenses and resulting in the occurrence of an accident.
Perrow (2004) developed the normal accident theory which describes how normal
accidents or system accidents occur due to multiple failures that are not in direct
operational sequence. The Swiss cheese model helps to expand on how active errors and
latent errors have an impact on the occurrence on an accident (Grant et al., 2018).
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Accident pathogens are adverse latent or preexisting conditions, passive or with no
impact on the system until triggered by other adverse events (Gnoni & Saleh, 2017).
When by chance all holes are aligned, the hazard reaches perfect alignment
creating the potential error or accident to occur (Perneger, 2005). One main point within
this model was the focus on human error and how each focused area can fall into latent
failures, active failure or active and latent failures (Reason, 1990). Figure 5 shows
updated version of the model which incorporated the defense-in-depth concept into the
model (Reason, 1990).
Figure 5
Updated Reason Model

Note. From Human Error, by J. Reason, 1990, Cambridge University Press.
While the model was updated in 1995, latent errors were later renamed to latent
failures because Reason realized that effective decisions at one point in time may have
unintended negative outcomes at another time in the system (Larouzee & Le Coze, 2020).
Further improvements were made to the model by Reason to illustrate that the holes will
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always be moved, changing in shape and size as a reaction of the acts from operator and
local demands (Suryoputro et al., 2015). Figure 6 shows the most current version of the
Swiss cheese model which has not been updated since 2000.
Figure 6
Current Version of Swiss Cheese Model

Note. From “Systems Thinking, The Swiss Cheese Model and Accident Analysis: A
Comparative Systemic Analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment Using ATSB, AcciMap
and STAMP models,” by P. Underwood, and P. Waterson, 2014, Accident Analysis and
Prevention, 68, p. 76 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2013.07.027).
Swiss Cheese Model Components
The Swiss cheese model consists of different components each having a different
effect on the potential occurrence of human error or accidents. The independent variables
in this study are train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew
members, and crew members length of time on duty. Each of the independent variables in
this study can be looked at as holes that occur in the slice of cheese to increase the chance
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of accidents to occur (Reason, 2016). The holes will create faults in the defense layer,
which in turn will increase the likelihood of accident occurrence (Peltomaa, 2012). The
Swiss cheese model explains the failure of numerous system barriers or safeguards to
block errors, each represented by holes in cheese slices that allow errors to pass through
and harm occur (Stein & Heiss, 2015). The first two components are active failures and
latent conditions which can occur either singly or in diabolical combination creating a
gap in the defenses (Reason, 2016). Finally, the third component is the defense that is
currently in place that was ineffective, failed or unavailable during the time of error.
Next, these components will be explained in more detail.
Active Failures. Active failures are unsafe acts, errors or procedural violations on
the part of those in direct contact with the system (Reason, 2016). Active failures can be
created by the operators which in turn create a weakness within the defensive layers in
the system. Also, active failures can create long lasting effects on the defenses or
protective layers that are currently available on the system. Reason (2000) stated that
almost all legal approaches seek an individual to blame for unsafe acts but almost all such
acts have a causal history that dates back in time or up through the levels of the system.
Active failures can also have direct impact on the safety of the system and because of this
create an environment for adverse effects to happen (Reason, 1997).
Latent Conditions. Latent conditions can be looked at as poor design, gaps in
supervision, undetected manufacturing defects or maintenance failures, unworkable
procedures, clumsy automation, shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools and
equipment and can go undetected in a system for years before they are combined with
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local circumstances and active failures to penetrate the many layers of defense (Reason,
1997). Latent conditions are present within the system before the operator interacts with
the system. Latent conditions are weaknesses or gaps in the defenses that were
unknowingly created by the engineers, designers, builders or stakeholders who were there
in the beginning creation of the system.
Every system has the possibility to have latent conditions as no system is built
perfect. The key importance with latent conditions is to identify them before they cause
harm to the system. Reason (2000) provided a great analogy on active and latent failures:
active failures are like mosquitos because they can be swatted one-by-one, but they keep
coming back. The best medicine is to create more effective defenses and to drain the
swamp where the mosquitos are bred. In this case, the swamps are the latent conditions
within the system.
Defenses. Defenses, barriers, or safeguards are put into place to protect the people
and assets that are within the local area of the hazard and could be exposed to potential
harm if an accident were to occur. Defenses can be categorized both according to the
various functions they serve and by the way the functions are achieved (Reason, 1997).
Defenses are created for more than one purpose but are in place to protect people and
local hazards. When creating defenses, Reason (1997) stated that creating defenses-indepth provide successful layers of protection, one behind the other, each guarding against
the possible breakdown of the one in front. Defenses should include a variety of functions
so if one fails the others have a chance to alarm when an accident is occurring before it
becomes too late to act. Another strategy for creating the defensive layers is to have
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mutually supporting defenses that protect against a single failure, either human or
technical.
These defenses are how the Swiss cheese model got its name because of the holes
like a piece of swiss cheese. The holes within the slice of cheese are dynamic, always
opening and closing, growing or shrinking, and shifting from one location to another.
Due to the nature of the holes in a single slice or defense it does not normally cause a bad
outcome but, if the error trajectory has a clear path through the system when all the holes
align momentarily, this can create the catastrophic accident to occur (Reason, 2016).
Comparing the Swiss Cheese Model to Other Models
The Swiss cheese model has been analyzed multiple times against other models to
see the links or disconnects. From the Swiss cheese model other researchers created their
own adaptation adding in additional variables that they felt were necessary to expand the
gap areas in the Swiss cheese model. For instance, the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) expanded the Swiss cheese model to explain the
different levels to human factors in accident occurrences (Underwood & Waterson,
2014). Leveson (2012) also adapted the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
which focused mainly on safety as a control problem. Each model is created from the
knowledge from the researcher and the context the application will be applied to. While
many researchers stated that the Swiss cheese model is still the most popular model used
(Underwood & Waterson, 2013), there could be further updates to the model on how the
holes line up to create the perfect line to create failure within the system.
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Variations of the Swiss cheese model have also been used to better understand
train accidents. Specifically, Underwood and Waterson (2014) conducted an analysis on
Grayrigg train derailment using the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB),
AcciMap, and systems theoretic accident modeling and processes (STAMP) model. The
ATSB was created from the Swiss cheese model and the modifications represent the
operation of a system via five levels of ‘safety factors’, where a safety factor is an event
or condition that increases safety risk (Underwood & Waterson, 2014). The ATSB model
used the Swiss cheese model for investigation and reporting within an accident, while
research and academic applications of accident analysis often were looked at using the
AcciMap and STAMP models (Underwood & Waterson, 2014).
Both AcciMap and STAMP are additional examples of models that are aligned
with the Swiss cheese model that have been applied to the train industry. The AcciMap
was developed by Rasmussen (1997) as a means of analyzing the series of interacting
events and decision-making processes which occurred throughout a socio-technical
system and resulted in a loss of control. This model was a combination of the causeconsequence chat and the Risk Management Framework which deals with the sociotechnical systems over six organizational levels. Underwood and Waterson (2014) used
this framework in their study because it pulled off the Swiss cheese model and also has
been used previously for analysis on train accidents. The STAMP model was based on
system and control theory, which focused on safety as a control problem. This model
looks at three basic constructs (safety constraints, hierarchical safety control, and process
models) to determine why control was ineffective and resulted in an accident. Safety
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constraints in this model can be looked at as passive or active and this is pulled from the
Swiss cheese model.
Underwood and Waterson (2014) sought to understand how the ATSB, AcciMap,
and STAMP differ from the Swiss cheese model but overall, how the Swiss cheese model
still preforms analysis from a system thinking approach. Although the ATSB, AcciMap,
and STAMP models each pull different aspects from the Swiss cheese model they still all
point back to the Swiss cheese model being an appropriate model to analyze system
thinking accidents.
Shappell and Wiegmann (2001) used the Swiss cheese model to further focus on
the latent and active failures to create the HFACS. The HFACS framework creation
helped to bridge the gap between theory and practice by providing investigators with a
comprehensive, user-friendly tool for identifying and classifying the human causes
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). The creation of the HFACS model was the most
successful adaptation from the Swiss cheese model that is used within the industry today.
There are two causal factors explained in this model symptomatic causal factors which
are direct or active causes; the initiating events that lead to system failure and latent
causal factors which are both spatially and temporally disparate from the system failure;
the factors that increase the potential for systematic causal factors (Erjavac et al., 2018).
HFACS models help to understand the human factors that can contribute to the
occurrence of accidents within different industries. The main focus within the HFACS
system is that human errors can happen at four levels: organizational influences, unsafe
supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and the unsafe acts of operators. The model
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shows that there latent and active failures but there is an increase focus on human aspect
of these failures. The HFACS model is useful to identify the organizational and systemic
weakness rather than focusing on blaming the individual for the accident (Theophilus et
al., 2017).
Other versions of the Swiss cheese model have been created to further define
some of the areas that other researchers have criticized because of the lack of detail.
Some criticism that is seen around the use of the Swiss cheese model could come from
the misuse within certain industries. For example, Collins et al. (2014) analyzed use in
the medical field to understand the active failures. While active failures are an important
part of the Swiss cheese model there is still the need to look at all aspects of the model
because this will have an overall impact on the conclusions found within the study. The
latest Swiss cheese model was updated in 2000.
Many researchers since then have created other models to attempt to address the
criticisms of the current Swiss cheese model. Li and Thimbleby (2014) developed the hot
cheese model which went into a more complex version of the Swiss cheese model where
there are eight different ‘types’ of cheese layers. The development of this model came
from Li and Thimbleby who found that the Swiss cheese model didn’t display the
situations and interactions between the layers also felt that the categorization with the
unsafe acts of error, violations, and reckless behaviors were not transparent in the model.
While Li and Thimbleby were trying to achieve a more detailed explanation on the Swiss
cheese model it got flooded with the creation of the eight layers of cheese. Another issue
that might have led to the development of a further defined model is the lack of
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understanding within the layers that were defined in the Swiss cheese model. The hot
cheese model has not successfully superseded the Swiss cheese model and other authors
have not regularly referred to it within researcher articles. Although the researchers had a
goal for the creation of this method, the expansion of the layers has caused issues with
other researchers using it within their field (Li & Thimbleby, 2014).
Within this section, I provided a detailed analysis on the Swiss cheese model
which is the theoretical framework in this study. This analysis included the organizational
accidents and accident causation, Swiss cheese model, the evolution of the Swiss cheese
model, Swiss cheese model components and comparing the Swiss cheese model to other
models. I provided detailed information on why the Swiss cheese model was the best
choice for the theoretical framework. The next section of this literature review will be on
accidents across industries, train derailments and the impact they have on the research to
be conducted in this doctoral study.
Causes of Accidents
Throughout multiple industries there is the chance for accidents to occur by
human or nonhuman errors. Human errors include personality, attitude toward road
safety, attention, concentration, and memory (Santoso & Maulina, 2019). Human error
can also be related to environmental interfaces, organizational and technical factors or
even the personal like of the employees (Rong et al., 2016; Tripathy & Ala, 2018). Nonhuman errors include visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members length
of time on duty and road conditions. It is important to understand how these factors
impact the likelihood of accident occurrence. There is variation across each system

30
domain but 60% to 80% of system failures are, to a certain extent, attributable to human
performance (Erjavac et al., 2018). Human errors, technical failures, and mechanical
failures make up the majority factors that occur when an accident happens in industry
accidents.
Weather can have an impact on the visibility and increase accident risk. Accident
risk is significantly heightened during snowy and icy road conditions (Malin et al., 2019).
For snowy and icy road conditions, Salli et al. (2008) found that accidents were more
than four times higher compared to bare roads and slushy roads were fivefold for causing
fatal accidents. In windy conditions, there is an increase in the frequency of rollovers and
sideslip and spin accident occurrences (Zou et al., 2021). Weather can have an impact on
occurrences of accidents because response time can be limited for the operator.
Time of duty has been shown to impact accident occurrences due to the
connection to fatigue. Worker fatigue can be caused by no limit on employee weekly or
monthly work hours, irregularity or unpredictability of on-call work schedules,
mandatory commuting distances without compensatory time off (Coplen & Sussman,
2000). Within each industry there are different standards to the limitation on how many
hours workers can work in one day but there are not the same standards established
across all industries. Since there are not limitations on workdays, excess time on duty can
cause workers to become tired because they are wanted to complete the task within the
day. Within the North American Rail Alertness Partnership there are eight key
components for an effective fatigue countermeasure program education and training,
employee scheduling practices, emergency response requirements, alertness strategies,
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evaluation of policies and procedures, adequate rest environments, work environment,
and implementation strategies (Coplen & Sussman, 2000). Crew members that have been
on duty for extended periods of time are more likely to have poor or reduced alertness,
poor psychometric conditions, and impairs the overall health of workers which can have
impacts of accident occurrences (Peng et al., 2020).
The number of crew members on duty also has an impact on the occurrences of
accidents. With more crew members on duty there are more eyes on the train tracks to
help detect potential situations that can cause train accidents. Crew members within the
railroad can consist of engineers/operators, firemen, conductors, and brakemen (FRA,
2021). Each crew member has an important role on the operation of the train engine and
the rail cars that are pulled along with the train. If the train members are limited there is a
chance for members to be distracted and accidents to occur (Coplen & Sussman, 2000).
There is a need for more research to fully understand the impact that number of crew
members has on the occurrence of train derailments. In this study, I aimed to understand
the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of
crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and occurrence of train derailment.
The focus in this literature review is on aviation accidents, maritime accidents,
and railroad accidents. Within each sector, the factors impacting accident occurrence will
be discussed along with what researchers are currently still looking to understand. Train
derailments will also be covered, including the causes of train derailments. This
information is important because the focus of this study was to understand the factors that
have an impact on the occurrence of train derailment. Information on factors that impact
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the occurrence of accident will be helpful to inform management within each sector on
how employees and crew members can help to decrease the likelihood of an accident to
occur (Reason, 1995).
Aviation Accidents
The aviation sector includes general aviation and air carriers. General aviation is
air travel that is apart from scheduled air carriers. General aviation accounts for more
than 85% of all aviation fatalities and over 95% of all fatal accidents even though flight
hours between general aviation and air carrier operations are similar (Fuller & Hook,
2020). In the aviation field, pilot error is attributed to 75% of all aviation accidents
(Gramopadhye & Drury, 2000). The overall aviation accident rate has declined since
World War II; however, the incidence of human error has not improved and remains the
primary flight safety risk (Erjavac et al., 2018). Looking at the potential for human error,
it is known that within a complex system there is no way to avoid human influence on
accidents (Reason, 1995). Human error can account for intentional or unintentional
violations of procedures or from organizational influences from management that causes
effects on flights (Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019).
The top two causes of aircraft accidents are loss of control in-flight and controlled
flight into terrain. The main difference between the two is that controlled flight into
terrain is an in-flight collision or near collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without
indication of loss of control (Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019). Accidents within the aviation
industry can also be caused due to the pilot and crew losing the sense of situational
awareness. Loss of situation awareness can be seen when pilots and air crew forget to
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ensure pre-flight planning is completed, improving manual flight skills, and maintaining
a high-level of specific aircraft mechanical and avionics knowledge (IATA, 2014).
Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) used the Swiss cheese model to create the
HFACS which helped to further break down what factors impact the occurrence of
aviation accidents. At a top level in HFACS there is unsafe acts which are classified into
two categories: errors and violations. Figure 7 was created from their analysis, which
explains the unsafe acts of pilot operators. These acts can be broken down from errors
into skill-based errors, decision errors, and perceptual errors. Acts can include human and
nonhuman errors. The violations can then be broken down into multiple causes that can
impact the occurrence of an aviation accident occurrence.
Figure 7
Unsafe Acts of Pilot Operators
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Note. From “The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System-HFACS,” by S.
Shappell, and D. Wiegmann, 2000, ResearchGate.
(https://commons.erau.edu/publication/737).
Just like unsafe acts of the pilots, there can also be unsafe acts from the air crew.
These can include human and nonhuman influence factors. At the top level, the air crew
could be dealing with adverse mental states which could affect their performance when
under pressure. Another potential area for the aircrew to deal with would be physiological
states which could include fatigue and medical illness. Other areas of impact to the
aircrew could be physical/mental limitations, crew resource management, and personal
readiness. Each of these categories can be further expanded as shown in Figure 8 below.
These factors are important to understand when safety officers are analyzing what factors
caused an aviation accident to occur.
Figure 8
Unsafe Aircrew Conditions
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Note. From “The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System-HFACS,” by S.
Shappell, and D. Wiegmann, 2000, ResearchGate.
(https://commons.erau.edu/publication/737).
According to the IATA (2014) there are other factors that can impact the potential
occurrence of aviation accidents. These other factors are noncompliance with established
standard operating procedures, inadequate flight path management, lack of vertical and/or
horizontal position awareness in relation to terrain, un-stabilized approached, failure to
initiate a go-around when required, conducting operations in poor weather conditions,
incorrect action/response by flight crew, and failure in crew resource management such
as cross-checking, communications, coordination, and leadership. All of these factors
plus human error can increase the chances of an inflight accident to occur within the
aviation industry.
Researchers are still conducting analyses to understand how upgrading the
technology and training for pilots can help to limit the occurrence of an aviation accident
to occur (Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019). While there will never be a 100% elimination of the
factors that can cause an aviation accident to occur advancements in technology could
help pilots and flight crew to identify when an accident will occur and the proper
precautions to take before the situation escalates into the loss of life (IATA, 2014). More
pilots are being trained through simulation on procedures to complete when an accident is
occurring. Flight simulators are used extensively for training procedures as they permit
more in-depth, safer, and more flexible instruction that is possible with real flight
(Koglbauer, 2016).
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Maritime Accidents
Over the years, there has been an increase in the number of items being
transported via maritime way. Researchers identified that 65% of the 74 Greek maritime
accidents analyzed from 1992 to 2005 each accident had more than one causal factor, but
most accidents were caused by human error, 76% of these were due to negligence on the
bridge of the ship, 17% to human error in the engine room and the remaining 7%
elsewhere on board (Antao & Soares, 2019). Some of the most common reasons for
accidents within the maritime sector are grounding, ship sinking, fire, collision, contact
damage, dragging, wind damage and human factors (Xue et al., 2020).
Different weather conditions can also affect the situational awareness of the crew
on the ship and make the changes of accident occurrence higher. When weather occurs, it
can have an effect on the decision-making ability of the crew and can have lasting effect
on the ship (Antao & Soares, 2019). Other factors that impact the occurrence of accidents
are organization are fatigue, training, and other external factors.
When conducting analysis on maritime accidents, researchers identified a need to
understand how incompetent or insufficient personnel and competent personnel can
contribute to the occurrences of accidents (see Figure 9). The errors that occur in both of
these groups can be broken down into insufficiencies, inequities, ambiguities, and excess
(Apostol-Mates & Barbu, 2019). One important factor that researchers sought to
understand further is the impact of fatigue on the overall operation of the crew. Fatigue
can decrease the operator’s work performance, by manifestations like slowing down
physical and mental reflexes and cutbacks in making rational evaluations (Apostol-Mates
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& Barbu, 2019). Fatigue can have a big impact on the occurrences of accidents and a
decrease in the security levels that are normal in place when operators are at their full
potential. Apostol-Mates and Barbu (2019) noted that as the total work hours per week,
hours of work per day, and number of consecutive night duties per week increased, there
was decreased output from the crew. The same can be said when the hours of rest
between duty periods and number of short breaks within duty periods decreased,
accidents were more likely to occur.
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Figure 9
Errors in Maritime Accidents

Note. From “Fatigue leading to human error: A study based on marine accidents,” by R.
Apostol-Mates, and A. Barbu, 2019, Scientific Bulletin of Naval Academy.
(https://doi.org/10.21279/1454-864X-19-12-013).
While modern ships have been updated to include advanced technologies such as
navigation technology, onboard information, and bridge resource management systems,
human factors are still present in the majority of accidents (Fan et al., 2020). All
accidents within the maritime sector have some contributions from human or nonhuman
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causal factors. Nonhuman factors may include weather, visibility, number of crew
members on duty, and length of time on duty for the crew members. Since the weather
patterns can be spatial in different oceans around the world this can cause a challenge for
the crew when responding to weather changes, visibility limitations, and length of time
on duty for the crew (Zhang et al., 2021). However, researchers have stated that human
elements account for 75%-96% of maritime casualties within accidents that occur in the
modern ships and has not changed over time (Fan et al., 2020). Human factors can be
broken down into workplace conditions, physical and natural environment, procedures,
technology, training, organization, management, fatigue, task load, and mental state.
A majority of the accidents have more than one contributing factor. A
combination of factors may create the perfect holes in the defenses to cause an accident.
Some of the factors that work together are poor crew competence, fatigue, lack of
communication, lack of proper maintenance, lack of application of safety culture and
protocols or other procedures, inadequate training, poor situational assessment, and stress
(Fan et al., 2018). Safety analysis can be completed on maritime accidents to fully
understand what occurred when the accident happened. From this research, procedures
and protocols can be updated so management and crew members can help to limit the
occur of accidents. Updating research procedures and protocols can help to ensure that
crew members and management are aware of some of the precursors that lead to accident
occurrence (Xue et al., 2020).
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Railway Accidents
Within the railroad industry, accidents can be broken down into derailment, head
on collision, rear end collision, side collision, raking collision, broken train collision,
highway-rail crossing, railroad grade crossing, obstruction, explosion-detonation,
fire/violent rupture, and other impacts (FRA, 2021). The railroad sector is broken down
into freight and passenger trains. Freight is moving railcars with different consumer items
and passenger trains more people from one location to another. Also, within the railroad
sector, there are different classes of railroad depending on the yearly profit from that
company. There are multiple factors within the railroad sector that have an impact on the
occurrence of an accident to occur.
Within the railroad industry, there are multiple commodities that can be moved,
including hazardous material, fuel, oil, grains, stones, ice salt, and multiple other items.
There are multiple ways a train accident could happen which include improper track
conditions, weather, visibility, time on duty, operator error, and other impending factors.
Researchers have looked to understand the relation between train accident causes and the
narrative that is included within the accident report (Heidarysafa et al., 2018). Since only
the primary and secondary codes are recorded within the FRA accident reporting sheet,
the narrative could help to explain other important factors that contributed to the
occurrence of the train accident. This narrative also helps to explain if there were
circumstances that were outside the control of the conductor and engineer on the train.
Studies have shown that changes to the technical condition of railroad tracks,
railroad bridges, tunnels, crossings, individual cars, and the entire rolling stock, may
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enhance the safety of rail transport (Aliev et al., 2019). This information is important in
areas around the world that have seismic activity where the integrity of the track
equipment can be altered. In other areas around the world, it is important to ensure that
track maintenance is conducted because the track can be worn out over time. One
important issue that is new with little research is the upgrade to Positive Train Control
brake system since the current brakes have been used since the civil war era (Schouten,
2016). One issue with the old brake system is that the hardware could be broken down
and increase the chances of derailment occurrence. This breakdown has been seen
multiple times with oil lines which caused concern from lawmakers (Schouten, 2016).
In the railroad sector, once an accident occurs, crew members are required to
complete a form to detail what occurred and the factors that contributed to the train
accident. There are only two fields where crew members can list the causal code for the
derailment, and this is their primary and contributing factor to the train accident
occurrence. Crew members give a detailed encounter of the train accident which helps
safety officials determine what happened and how to correct this within the industry to it
does not occur again (Heidarysafa et al., 2018).
The occurrence of train derailments can be attributed to human operator and
nonhuman operator causal factors. Outside of human and nonhuman errors other factors
can have an impact on the occurrences of train derailments such as, weather, visibility,
number of crew members on duty, and crew members length of time on duty. There is
still much analysis to be completed on this field to fully understand how multiple factors
can feed into the overall occurrences of train derailments.
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Train Derailment
All railroad employees have the responsibility to report accidents when they occur
and ensure that the information recorded is accurate. Derailments are the most common
type of train accident accounting for more than 70% of incidents that occurred between a
fifteen-year period 2001-2015 with a total of 27,014 incidents (Li et al., 2018). With
respect to Class I and Class II railroads they accounted for 20,249 derailments (Li et al.,
2018). Within the accident causal codes during this fifteen-year period, there were 7,753
derailments from operator causal factors and 19,261 derailments from nonoperator causal
factors. I will focus on derailments for my study due to the high percentage of accidents
that are caused by derailments. The accident reports include important information to
understand how multiple factors impact the occurrence of train derailments. This
information can help railway managers to understand the relationship that multiple
factors have with the occurrence of train derailments and how this information might help
to eliminate the occurrences of derailments within the railroad industry. The causal codes
in the accident reports can help to minimize the occurrence of train derailments by further
understanding how the causal codes once broken down into operator and nonoperator,
have an impact on the number of train derailments.
Train derailments can cause huge financial impacts to the company over time if
they occur multiple times throughout the year and cause lasting effects on the operations
within the company. The derailments during a fifteen-year period 2001-2015 had a
financial impact of more than $30.7 million on railroad companies. Costs from train
derailments can further be broken down into how much operator causal factors and
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nonoperator causal factors each cost the rail lines when the derailment occurs.
Researchers have argued that train derailment risk management should be further
examined such as human factors, rail parts failure, semaphore and control systems,
vehicle-track interaction, and other contributing factors to train derailments (Zhang &
Sun, 2019).
Track maintenance needs to be completed at highest efficiency because this can
help to prevent the train derailments. Currently it is estimated that track maintenance
accounted for 30-40% of the total operating cost (Miwa & Oyama, 2018). Ensuring that
track maintenance is completed before the issue is serious will help to mitigate the
occurrence of train derailments due to lack of maintenance on the rail lines.
There has been further analysis completed on train derailments and the lasting
effects that they can have on employees and the likelihood of train derailments to occur
from the employee again. Holmes and Rahe (1967) are American psychologists that
suggest certain situations cause change in human behavior, making it necessary for
adjustments so we can deal with those events. These events have been known as life
events and they can create high-stress levels for the individuals that experienced the event
(Floris et al., 2021). Stress can be looked at as an advanced state of homeostasis, in which
individuals reach behaviorally, physiologically and psychologically, in an attempt to
return to normal homeostasis (Paluch et al., 2018). When looking at life events and the
stress that can occur from such events, each individual has a different response
mechanism if the life event was the occur again (Floris et al., 2021).
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While working on the railroad, there is a chance for employees to experience a
traumatic event. Most of the time this traumatic event is related to individuals committing
suicide and running in front of the train or jumping from bridges (Li et al., 2018). When
these incidents occur, employees are required to pull the train brake and stop the train to
report what happened to the local authority. When this occurs, this can cause a train
derailment as the employee pulls the brake too fast and other factors play into what
occurred when the train was stopped. From these traumatic incidents, employees might
be on edge or experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder.
When an incident occurs, there are multiple forms that need to be completed and
recorded within the FRA safety website. All information included within the form will
help others to understand what occurred when the derailment happened. Included within
the form is the causal code for the derailment and whether it was an operator or
nonoperator causal factors. Next, I will provide a detailed analysis on the train derailment
reporting process and the causes for train derailments.
Train Derailment Causes. The FRA complies the accident reports submitted into
the rail equipment accident database, which contains information about the accident
location, speed, consist type, and damage cost, along with other important information
(Liu et al., 2017). The causal factors for each derailment are included within the
accident/incident report. The FRA has more than 350 codes used for the causal factors of
train derailments. Causal codes are broken down into main level headings and then
further detailed into the applicable codes that are used when reporting on the Form FRA
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F 6180.97. Within the FRA accident database, the causal codes are not broken down into
operator causal codes and nonoperator causal codes.
Operator causal factors, within the FRA Guide for Preparing Accident/Incident
Reports (2021), include (a) brakes, use of, (b) employee physical condition, (c) flagging,
fixed, hand and radio signals, (d) general switching rules, (e) main track authority, (f)
train handling/train makeup, (g) speed, (h) switches, use of, (i) cab signals, and (j)
miscellaneous (see Appendix B, Table 1). Operator causal factors are important to
understand because this can help understand the factors human have impact on when a
train derailment occurs. Within the list of operator causal factors there are many
important safety factors that need to be understood by employees or train derailments
may happen. The physical condition of the employee is also included within the causal
codes. Included within this area is the impairment, incapacitation, restriction in work,
employee asleep and employee physical condition. If one of these causal codes is listed
on the accident report, it could cause further investigation into the employee and what
occurred on the train.
Operator causal factors, within the FRA Guide for Preparing Accident/Incident
Reports (2021), include (a) track, roadbed, and structures, (b) signal and communication,
and (c) mechanical and electronic failures (see Appendix B, Table 2). Nonoperator causal
factors are the factors that humans do not have control over. Primarily these deal with the
mechanical aspect of the tracks or rail car that the employees do not have the ability to
stop before it occurs. There have been many articles published on the need to ensure that
maintenance is completed on the tracks and ensuring that during times of extreme
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weather precautions are taken before trains get onto the tracks (Miwa & Oyama, 2018).
Completing the maintenance beforehand can help to limit the number of train derailments
that occur. All employees need to understand the track and when there are issues during
the extreme weather that might occur in that region. Contracted personnel need to ensure
that shortcuts are not taken when performing the maintenance and if anything were to
occur the day of maintenance this would be on management to get with the contracted
company to see what was performed or what might have been missed.
Research on Train Derailments
There has been no research conducted on the relationship between train
derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members
length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. In contrast, there were
multiple studies on the causes of train derailment or the after effect of a train derailment
and how to improve the occurrence of train derailments occurring (Hunter-Zaworski,
2017; Underwood & Waterson, 2014; Zhang & Sun, 2019).
Underwood and Waterson (2014) completed an analysis on the Greyrigg train
derailment using the Swiss cheese model to see if the train accident occurred from a
system thinking approach. The researchers included different elements from the Swiss
cheese model or expanded on the model completely. Underwood and Waterson (2014)
completed the analysis on a single train derailment to fully understand the best model
when looking at the accident causation models currently available for use in analysis on
train derailments. They determined that the Swiss cheese model was still a viable method
on analyzing train derailments. It was determined that the Greyrigg train derailment had
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multiple factors that caused the derailment to occur which are an incomplete
understanding within Network Rail of points maintenance requirements which caused an
absence of clear, properly briefed standard for maintenance (Underwood & Waterson,
2014).
Hunter-Zaworski (2017) completed an analysis on passenger incident data from
five rail transit systems in the United States and Canada. The researcher wanted to
understand the injury incident data to help improve safety at rail transit platform/train and
platform/guideway interfaces. Since this research was on transit trains, Hunter-Zaworski
was looking to understand the platforms where passengers entered the car. There was also
analysis completed on the platform/guideway interfaces to see where the issues were
occurring with the train cars. From the analysis, the researcher was able to understand the
issues that were occurring for passengers to report injury while boarding trains at
platform locations. The results gave safety officers and managers ideas on how to help
passengers and also ensure that maintenance was being completed to limit the
occurrences of derailment with passenger railcars.
Zhang and Sun (2019) completed an analysis on how the multicriteria decisionmaking model can be used to help with train derailment risk response strategies that can
help limit the occurrences of train derailments. Both researchers found that train
derailments can result in interruptions within train operations and can cause serious
delays. The researchers acknowledge that there should be increased attention on
derailments risk management, such as human factors, rail parts failure, semaphore and
control systems, and so many more areas. Zhang and Sun’s primary focus was to help the
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Huangyangcheng station located in Shemu City, Shaanxi. Information within this article
could be expanded to other locations to see the potential impact that it has on other
railroad stations around the world.
Researchers have looked at safety within the railroad industry and how this can
further be improved by the implementation of new processes or more strict safety
procedures on the trains (Hunter-Zaworski, 2017). For researchers to better understand
the train safety and risk analysis associated with train derailments, the derailment rates
need to be accurately estimated through the train derailment rate.
Liu et al. (2017) found that higher FRA track classes had lower derailments rates,
varying by more than an order of magnitude. This came as no surprise because higher
FRA track classes are intended to ensure safe operations when operating at a higher speed
which requires a more robust maintenance schedule for these tracks. There is still a need
to understand the causal factors whether operator or nonoperator and the number of train
derailments. The findings within this proposed study may help to management
understand the causal factors for train derailments and how to improve risk management.
Lui et al,’s (2017) findings in this study have the potential to improve business
practice because they can help railroad managers increase their knowledge on operator
causal factors, nonoperator causal factors, and their interaction influence train
derailments. Understanding the relationship can help railroad management update current
procedures and policies to help crew members be prepared for the common causal factors
that impact train derailment occurrences. The relationship can also help management
understand the potential impacts that weather, visibility, number of crew on duty and
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crew members length of time on duty have on the occurrences of train derailments.
Management can understand how over exerting employees can have catastrophic impact
on train derailment occurrences.
Transition
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between train
derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members
length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. In Section 1, I discussed
the background of the study, problem statement, purpose statement, nature of the study,
research question, hypotheses, theoretical framework, operational definitions,
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, significance of the study, and review of the
professional and academic literature. The literature review consisted of the theoretical
framework the Swiss cheese model which further looked at organizational accidents and
accident causation, Swiss cheese model, the evolution of the Swiss cheese model, Swiss
cheese models components, and comparing the Swiss cheese model to other models.
Next, I addressed accident occurrences in other industries which includes aviation
accidents, maritime accidents, railway accidents, train derailments, and train derailment
causes. Finally, there was a discussion on research on train derailments which included
current research conducted on train derailments and their occurrences.
In Section 2, I restate the restatement of the purpose statement, role of the
researchers, participants, research method, research design, population and sampling,
ethical research, data collection, data analysis, and study validity. In Section 3, I include a
presentation of findings, application to professional practice, implications for social
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change, recommendations for action, recommendations for further research, reflection,
and conclusion.
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Section 2: The Project
Section 2 describes the research project by including the purpose statement and
describing the role of the researcher, participants, research method, and research design.
Also included in this section is a detailed discussion on the population and sampling,
ethical research, data collection, and data analysis. Section 2 concludes with addressing
study validity and reliability followed by a conclusion and transition into Section 3.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew
members, crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
The independent variables were train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather,
number of crew members, and crew members length of time on duty. The dependent
variable was the occurrence of train derailment, represented as a dichotomous variable.
The targeted sample population consisted of Class I and Class II rail lines in the railroad
industry across the United States. Data collection was completed through the FRA Office
of Safety Analysis, which is a publicly available database. All derailment safety reports
are reported and complied on this site. The implications for social change include the
potential to reduce the frequency of train derailment occurrences in the railroad industry
and save lives.
Role of the Researcher
The role of the researcher in the data collection and analysis process in a
quantitative study is to ensure that the sample size is adequate, that there is consistency,
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reliability, and validity in the data, and that data analysis is completed (Kyvik, 2013).
Though I have not worked in the railroad industry, I have multiple family members who
have worked in the railroad industry for more than 28 years. My role in this data
collection and analysis for this study was to pull the data from the FRA safety database
website, which was filtered down by the railroad class to Class I and Class II railroads in
the United States. From the information pulled in the FRA safety site, I analyzed the train
derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, and crew
members length of time on duty. This information was coded according to the list
included in Appendix C.
The Belmont Report (2003) was created to provide principles when dealing with
human subjects for biomedical and behavioral research, providing specific regulations
under the common rule of fundamental principles research should follow (Metcalf, 2016).
As a researcher, it is important to provide participants with a safe environment and to
ensure that they are assured information received during interviews will be confidential.
However, I did not use surveys, interviews, or participants for my data collection. Due to
the information for this study being collected from a secondary source, with no human
interaction, I did not require consent from participants for this study. The secondary
source used for data collection helped to complete the statistical analysis pertaining to the
topic of operator causal factors, nonoperator causal factors, and their interaction influence
train derailments.
In the role of the researcher, bias should be mitigated to avoid influencing the
outcome of the data (Daigneault, 2014). During data collection, I was not employed by
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the railroad, and I did not have direct contact to management within any railroad
company. The data collected from the FRA website also followed a specific data
collection and analysis protocol. Data were collected from the FRA website on Class 1
and Class II railroads, and the causal codes were further separated into operator causal
factors and nonoperator causal factors.
Participants
There were no participants in this study. No railroad companies, management, or
employees were contacted for participation in this study. All information for this study
was collected from the FRA safety website, which is a publicly available platform. I
pulled information on Class I and Class II railroads in the United States.
Research Method and Design
Research Method
I selected a quantitative methodology for this study. The quantitative method is
used to express the evaluation results with intuitive data, which is more objective, and the
quantitative results are more scientific, rigorous, and profound (Du et al., 2019; Pickett,
2020; Teng et al., 2020). Quantitative research is also more applicable when the data are
already available on a platform. For this study, all the data were pulled from a public
platform and there will not be any interaction with management or personnel working
within the company. Further, quantitative methods are used to find patterns, make
predictions, test relationships, and to understand the research questions that are asked
(Barnham, 2015; Paul & Garg, 2014). Quantitative methods are used to test a theory
rather than develop a theory, as would be the case with a qualitative research method
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(Barnham, 2015; Guetterman et al., 2015). In this study, variables were analyzed to
assess and test their relationships.
In contrast, qualitative research methods are more applicable when the researcher
wants to understand the human side of business by going into the natural setting of the
company, exploring how people make sense and meaning, and their lived experience
(Gergen et al., 2015). Qualitative research is more applicable when wanting to ask
questions and understand the lived experience of someone. Qualitative research methods
are used to answer the why questions dealing with the research topic. The purpose of this
study was not to investigate the behaviors or experiences from workers within the
railroad industry. Instead, the purpose of this study was to test the hypotheses using
secondary data that is provided within the FRA safety database.
The mixed method is used when researchers want to understand aspects of
qualitative and quantitative research methods and pull different factors from each
method. The benefit of this method is when researchers are looking to eliminate the
weakness of one research method (Afrifa, 2013; Sahin & Ozturk, 2019). However, the
objective of my study was not to look at qualitative and quantitative methods; it was to
understand the relationship between variables. Since I looked at exclusively variables, the
mixed method was not applicable for this study.
Research Design
There are different research designs that can be used when conducting a
quantitative study, which include experimental, quasi-experimental, and correlational
design (Roberts & Povee, 2014; Wells et al., 2015). The research design for this study
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was a correlational design to understand the relationship without manipulating any of the
independent variables. All data for this study were pulled from the FRA safety database
and were not manipulated for data analysis. The goal of this study was to examine the
relationship between five independent variables and one dependent variable, which aligns
with a correlational design.
Experimental and quasi-experimental are two other quantitative research designs
not chosen for the study. Experimental research focuses on potential causal relationships
(Kuhberger et al., 2014), and manipulation is used to see how the dependent variable
responds to changes in the independent variable (Andeweg et al., 2020; Geuens & De
Pelsmacker, 2017). A quasi-experimental design is similar to experimental but lacks
random assignment (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2018; Tavakol & Pinner, 2019). For this study,
I collected data from Class I and Class II railroad in the United States; I did not put the
railroads into assigned participant groups. The experimental or quasi-experimental design
were not appropriate for my study because I did not manipulate the data that were pulled
from the FRA database. The goal was to understand the relationship between variables,
which aligned with the correlational research design. Correlational design is used to use
statistical tools to assess relationships, which is then tested against the hypotheses to
answer to research questions involving all the variables (Aderibigbe & Mjoli, 2019;
Curtis et al., 2016; Vetter, 2017).
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Population and Sampling
Population
Population does not always mean people but can also detail the total quantity of
causes of things that are needed to research a subject (Etikan et al., 2016). The dependent
variable was the occurrence of train derailment, represented as a dichotomous variable.
The population consisted of all accidents for Class I and Class II railroads during the
2019 calendar year, which was collected from the FRA safety website as the most
relevant and appropriate record. The FRA safety website was the most reliable source for
this information because it includes all train accidents that have occurred on Class I and
Class II railroads each year. Due to the data selection options in the FRA database, I
decided to focus on Class I and Class II railroads.
Sampling
A sample is a subset of the total population being studied to answer research
questions. Nonprobabilistic sampling is used when elements of the population do not
have a known or equal probability of being selected (Turner, 2020). Purposive sampling
is used when the researcher selects subjects from the target population based on the fit
with the purpose of the study and specific inclusion and exclusion criteria (Etikan et al.,
2016). Purposive sampling can help with providing information on the topic on the
specific research question (Turner, 2020). Sampling deals with the selection of a subset
of the population within the research (Faul et al., 2009), but this study included the total
population of included Class I and Class II railroads during the 2019 calendar year. Using
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the entire population of Class I and Class II railroads in the United States removed any
sampling bias and subjectivity that can occur with sampling selection.
A power analysis was completed to show the sample size needed for the study
(see Faul et al., 2009; Appendix D). There were five independent variables, three of
which were recoded as dummy variables. The independent variables were train
derailment causal factors (three dummy variables), visibility (four dummy variables),
weather (six dummy variables), number of crew members, and crew members length of
time on duty. Using G* Power version 3.1.9.6 software, a logistic regression analysis,
assuming a medium effect size (f 2= .15), α = .05, and 15 independent variables,
identified that a minimum sample size of 139 participants is required to achieve a power
of .80 (see Appendix D, Figure D1). Increasing the sample size to 257 would increase
power to .99 (see Appendix D, Figure D2). For this study I used the total population,
which consisted of 1,396 accidents, exceeding the number of cases that were identified
from the power analysis. Using the total population allowed for a more robust analysis.
Ethical Research
I did not use participants or organizations in this study; therefore, I did not require
informed consent, nor did I have a procedure for participants to withdraw from the study.
The data on train accidents in Class I and Class II railroads was obtained from a public
safety website managed by the FRA. The data contained the name of the railroad
companies and location of the train derailments but was not included in this study. The
only information that was used in this study is the accident causal code and the Class of
railroad. The Walden Institutional Review Board approval number is 07-15-21-0983532.
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Instrumentation
For data collection, I used the FRA Office of Safety Analysis Query tool for
accident/incident trends, which is a public database. Data entered in this database come
from the FRA, consolidated reporting groups and individual railroads. Using the FRA
Office of Safety Analysis Query tool was the best option because all the necessary
information needed to complete the analysis in this study is included within the database.
The dependent variable came from the accident type and was coded 0 for an
accident not classified as a train derailment and 1 for an accident classified as a train
derailment. The dependent variable came from the type of accident/incident field reported
in the FRA database: 1 = derailment, 2 = head on collision, 3 = rear end collision, 4 =
side collision, 5 = raking collision, 6 = broken train collision, 7 = highway-rail crossing, 8
= railroad grade crossing, 9 = obstruction, 10 = explosion-detonation, 11 = fire/violent
rupture, and 12 = other impacts. Everything coded as derailment was coded as a 1 for an
accident classified as train derailment. Everything coded 2 through 13 was coded as a 0
for an accident classified not a train derailment.
The independent variables were train derailment causal factors (human or
nonhuman), visibility, weather, number of crew members, and crew members length of
time on duty. For the train derailment causal factors, I used the primary causal code and
secondary causal code (refer to Appendix B for operator and nonoperator causal codes).
Train derailment causal factors were initially be coded to operator, nonoperator, or both
causal factors. Visibility and weather were initially coded 1- XX depending on how many
factors are included within each category (refer to Appendix C for coding). Next, I had
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SPSS convert these into dummy variables for train derailment causal factors, visibility,
and weather, which coded the variables 1 for yes and 0 for no. This means that train
derailment causal factors became three dummy variables, visibility became four dummy
variables and weather became six dummy variables. Number of crew members and crew
members length of time on duty were expressed as continuous variables and were not
recoded. From the FRA Office of Safety Analysis Query tool, which outputted the
Accident/Incident Trend report for Class I and Class II railroads, the data were then
sorted into the applicable variable data columns and coded accordingly.
The data from the FRA website were exported into a Microsoft Excel file and
stored, filtered, and processed as indicated above. No surveys, interviews, or participants
were used, only the online tool populated by the FRA Office of Safety Analysis. All the
variables in my study came from this database.
The FRA database has been used in multiple studies to help researchers gather the
information needed for their studies. Zhang et al. (2019) used the FRA to analyze the
human factors that have an impact on the occurrence of freight train accidents in the
United States. From the database, they pulled information to understand how much
movement is made on the railroad network each year and also the occurrence of human
caused freight accidents. Analysis has also been completed on the analysis of passenger
incidents within five different rail transit systems (Hunter-Zaworski, 2017). The
researchers have used the FRA database to pull the injury reports that were completed
when an accident occurred on a rail transit system. Further, Calabrese et al. (2017) used
the FRA database to understand how many railroad accidents account for the casualties
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among maintenance of way employees and signalmen. The overall effort of this research
was to understand the human factors that contribute to the time-of-day effects on railroad
worker injury risk.
Reliability related to the consistency of a measure when using an instrument to
measure different variables (Heale & Twycross, 2015). For this study, all information
was gathered from the FRA Office of Safety Analysis database and was not altered other
than the recode variables as described above. Each time the data was pulled from the
website it was exported into the same excel sheet.
When using secondary databases for data collection, researchers need to ensure
that the sources are free from material error and bias (Parker, 2012). All accident reports
are completed by the railroads and then pulled into the FRA database. The records in the
database go back to 1975. If the report is pulled multiple times in the FRA database
information will not change, the only thing that will change is the personal selections that
the researcher is looking for. I pulled data from the FRA database on Class I and Class II
railroads and both reports included all the necessary information to complete the analysis
for this research topic. None of the fields were filtered out of either document.
Validity refers to the extent that a concept is accurately measured in a quantitative
study (Heale & Twycross, 2015). The FRA database uses a specific form to report all
occurrences of train derailments within the railroad industry. Both forms used (Form
FRA F 6180.54 & Form FRA F 6180.97) are the same throughout the entire railroad
community. The data fields on the forms are the same for each railroad company and all
companies are to fill out this form when a train derailment occurs. There data are then
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inputted into the database and can be exported into the excel sheet which is how I
obtained the required data for this research topic.
To gain access to the data in the FRA database permission is not needed, this is a
public website. The raw data for this study is attached in Appendix E to show how the
data is sorted when exported from the FRA database. From the raw data, tables were
populated in the study to show how it was separated into operator causal factors and
nonoperator causal factors.
Data Collection Technique
Data collection for this study was from a secondary source the FRA Office of
Safety Analysis Query tool for Accident/Incident Trends database. The research question
for this study was: What is the relationship between train derailment causal factors,
visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and
train derailment? Data for this study was collected from the FRA database. Before
downloading, the data was filtered into Class I and Class II railroads. For this study, the
research was completed on the 2019 calendar year since all reports have already been
complied for that year. I accessed this data from the FRA website and download the
required information from the Query tab, specifically the FRA Accident/Incident Query.
For the train derailment causal factors, I used the primary causal code and
secondary causal code (refer to Appendix B for operator and nonoperator causal codes).
Train derailment causal factors were initially be coded to operator, nonoperator, or both
causal factors. Visibility and weather were initially be coded 1- XX depending on how
many factors are included within each category (refer to Appendix C for coding). Next, I
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had SPSS convert these into dummy variables for train derailment causal factors,
visibility, and weather, which coded the variables 1 for yes and 0 for no resulting in three
variables for train derailment causal factors, four variables for visibility, and six variables
for weather. Number of crew members and crew members length of time on duty were
expressed as continuous variables and will not need to be recoded. See Appendix B & C
for details on how all independent variables were coded into the SPSS data file. For the
dependent variable, I took the data from the accident type field in the FRA database and
code each accident as derailment yes or no. Everything coded as derailment was coded as
a 1 for an accident classified as train derailment. Everything coded 2 through 13 was
coded as a 0 for an accident classified not a train derailment. All information that was
exported from the FRA database was not altered because the query function allows for
the selection of railroad class. Since I did not have to alter the data in the excel sheet this
helped improve the overall validity and reliability of the mentioned instrument
I collected data from the FRA database which includes all the necessary
information to complete my analysis and this data was exported into a Microsoft Excel
file and then sorted according to the Class I and Class II railroads. The first step after
pulling the data was to ensure that all sources contain relevant data to answer the research
question in this study. The goal of the FRA database is to ensure that all train
accident/incident trends are available for the public to see what accidents/train
derailments occurred each year on the railroad. The data can be pulled from the system
which allows for easy access to the data needed for this doctoral study. Data that are
entered into this system come from the FRA forms that are completed once the train
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accident/incident occurs. Details are inputted within the forms which will them be
updated in the system to ensure that it is easily accessible rather than having to look
through paper copies of the reports. After obtaining Institutional Review Board approval,
I collected data through electronic retrieval on train accidents that occurred on Class I and
Class II railroads during the 2019 calendar year.
Obtaining data from a secondary source via an electronic database can have both
advantages and disadvantages. Johnston (2014) stated that gathering information from a
secondary source is inexpensive because researchers can bypass instrument creation and
data collection stages by extracting the data from existing sources. Another advantage is
the ability to have the data easily accessible and not having to wait to gather potential
sensitive material. Other researchers have argued that secondary data saves time and
financial resources, while minimizing the threat of bias (Johnston, 2014; Parker, 2012).
Electronic forms of data can also make the data collection process easier than paper
forms and improve the overall outcome to data reliability (Li et al., 2015). The final
advantage is that researchers are afforded the opportunity to have data available when
accessing human participants is difficult. However, secondary data does have potential
limitations for the researcher. Obtaining data from achieved information may run into the
potential for incomplete or missing data, which might cause gaps in the data needed to
answer the research question.

64
Data Analysis
RQ: What is the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility,
weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and the
occurrence of train derailment?
Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant relationship between
train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew
members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): There is a statistically significant relationship
between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members,
crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
The dependent variable in this study was the occurrence of train derailment,
represented as a dichotomous variable. The independent variables were train derailment
causal factors (human or nonhuman), visibility, weather, number of crew members, and
crew members length of time on duty (see Appendix C for coding). The number of crew
members and crew members length of time on duty were continuous variables; the total
sum of each factor was entered into the SPSS database.
Correlation is a statistical measure of how closely and in what direction two
variables are potentially related (Emerson, 2015), and Pearson correlations explore the
linear relationship between variables (Sari et al., 2017). A correlation design allows
researchers to examine the relationship between or among two or more variables (Altman
& Krzywinski, 2015). Correlation designs also allow for the relationship between
multiple independent variables and a dependent variable (Green & Salkind, 2017). The
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objective of this study was to understand the relationship between train derailment causal
factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on
duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. Due to the objective of this research, the
correlation design was most applicable.
Regression analysis is a statistical technique that helps researchers to explore
relationships between numerically measured independent and dependent variables, which
can help researchers predict one variable based on the value of another variable (Hopkins
& Ferguson, 2014). This type of analysis can help when the researcher is trying to
understand how a change in an independent variable can have an effect on the dependent
variable. When a researcher uses one dependent variable and two or more independent
variable this will be called multiple regression or multilinear. The technique for analysis
depends on the number of variables the research is looking to analyze and the deserved
outcome from the completed analysis (Green & Salkind, 2017).
Binomial logistic regression is used to predict the probability of an observation
that falls into one or two categories of a dichotomous dependent variable and one or more
independent variable that is continuous or categorical (Laerd Statistics, 2017). Due to the
dependent variable being dichotomous because everything coded as derailment was
coded as a 1 for an accident caused by train derailment and everything coded 2 through
13 was coded as a 0 for an accident caused by something other than derailment, the
binomial logistic regression was the most appropriate analysis method for my study.
Train derailment causal factors, visibility, and weather are categorical nominal variables
because they were coded 1- XX depending on how many factors are included within each
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category. Number of crew members and crew members length of time on duty were
continuous variables; the total sum of each factor were entered into the SPSS database.
ANOVA is another statistical test a researcher can use to compare the difference
between samples (Tarlow, 2016). The ANOVA test is more applicable when the
researcher is dealing with a continuous dependent variable, while the independent
variables are categorical. The purpose of the ANOVA test is to understand the interaction
between the two independent variables on the dependent variable (Tarlow, 2016). The
ANOVA test was not appropriate for my study because I have a dichotomous dependent
variable which was coded into 0 for not classified as train derailment and 1 for classified
as train derailment.
Data cleaning relies on the identification and repair of data quality problems
(Prokoshyna et al., 2015). Data cleaning helps to ensure that outliers and errors are
removed from the data set (Fatima et al., 2017). There are times when collecting data that
the information included is incomplete or missing the details needed for the analysis.
Data cleaning helps the researcher with clearing out the data that is incomplete or missing
the important details related to the research topic. When I retrieved the data from the
FRA database it was exported into a excel file. Additional variables were added to
identify operator causal factors or nonoperator causal factors. Completing the data
cleaning in excel this helped when inputting the information into the SPSS program
because the data was free of error which could have an impact to the SPSS analysis.
Using Microsoft Excel can help with the data cleaning process because this can be
completed by filtering the data and seeing where the incomplete fields are within the
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document. Data missing in the excel sheet can have an effect on the validity of the study.
Ensuring that the data cleaning process is followed through will help to ensure that the
validity of the study does not get affected. In this study, I removed all entries that have
incomplete data and ensure that this does not affect the targeted sample size for this
study.
There are seven assumptions associated with binomial logistic regression: (a) one
dependent variable that is dichotomous (nominal variable with two outcomes), (b) one or
more independent variables that are continuous or nominal scale, (c) independence of
observations and the categories of the dichotomous dependent variable and all nominal
independent variables should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, (d) bare minimum of
15 cases per independent variable, (e) linear relationship between the continuous
independent variables and the logit transformation of the dependent variable, (f) no
multicollinearity, and (g) no outliers (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The first three assumptions
were met because the dependent variable was dichotomous (0 – classified as not a train
derailment, 1 – classified as train derailment), the independent variables are continuous
and categorical.
According to the power analysis completed the recommended sample size for this
study was 139 but all accidents within the calendar year 2019 for Class I and Class II
railroads were used in this study. For the linear relationship between the continuous
independent variables and the logit transformation of the dependent variable I used the
Spearman’s correlation coefficient approach, which measures the strength and direction
of association that exists between two variables measured on the ordinal scale (Laerd
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Statistics, 2017). Completing this test will show if there is statistical significance and if
there is a concern with the linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of
the dependent variable. The next assumption with logistic regression is that there is no
problem of multicollinearity. The absence of multicollinearity means that the independent
variables included in the regression analysis do not correlate too highly to each other
(Zahari et al., 2014). To assess multicollinearity, I reviewed the tolerance and variance
inflation factor (VIF) statistics in the SPSS data file output and look for a tolerance level
greater than .10 and a VIF less than 10 which indicates there is not multicollinearity
among the independent variables (Zahari et al., 2014).
The final assumption with logistic regression is that there are no outliers in the
data. Outliers are cases with extreme scores on one or more of the independent variables
and this can cause distortions within the regression equation (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
Within SPSS I checked the casewise list for accident incidents that were above 2.5 in
deviation, which mean they are outliers and should be corrected or deleted from the data
set.
For this study, SPSS version 25 was used for data analysis once the excel sheet
was inputted into the software. When understanding the logistic regression analysis, the
following factors were included in the analysis table (a) b, (b) SE, (c) Wald, (d) df, (e) p,
(f) odds ratio (Exp B), and (g) 95% confidence interval for odds ratio. Beta (b) is the
probability of making a Type II error in a hypothesis test by incorrectly concluding there
is no statistical significance (Hollstein & Prokopczuk, 2016). Beta includes the values by
which the researcher should multiply each independent variable to predict the dependent
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variable (train derailment). The independent variable that has a larger absolute beta value
has a great impact on the dependent variable than does independent variables with
smaller absolute variables (Hollstein & Prokopczuk, 2016).
The Standard Error are values are associated with the beta coefficients. These
values describe how precisely the model estimates each coefficient’s real but unknown
value (Laerd Statistics, 2017). The SE can help researchers to test whether the value for
each beta is significantly different than zero. Along with this the standard error can be
used to for a confidence interval for the beta (Bekkar & Wansbeek, 2016). The SE can
determine the likelihood that the beta falls between a specific higher or lower value.
The Wald test is used to determine statistical significance for each of the
independent variables (Laerd Statistics, 2017). Wald is also the chi-square value and can
be used with the p value to determine the likelihood that the beta coefficients differ
significantly from those obtained by chance (Voinov, 2015). The df are the number of
values in the final calculation of a statistic that are free to vary (Gherekhloo et al., 2016).
There is currently a one-degree freedom for each independent variable. The more degrees
of freedom in the model, the higher Wald must be to reject the null hypothesis that the
true value of the associated beta coefficient is actually zero (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
The p value represents the statistical significance of each independent variable in
the model (Stern, 2016). Along with this the p value can show the likelihood that the true
value of the associated independent variables in the population are actually zero. A p
value less than .05 is accepted as statistically significant (Stern, 2016) or also unlikely to
have occurred by chance.
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The Exp (B) is the probability and informs the researcher of the change in the
odds for each increase in one unit of the independent variable (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
The odds ratio is defined as when given a particular value for an independent variable
that an event will occur, divided by the probability that an event will not occur (Lui,
2016). The odds ratio measures how much each independent variable increase the
likelihood of an outcome, in this case it will determine train derailments. The 95%
confidence interval of the odds ratio is used to determine whether the association is
statistically significant (Laerd Statistics, 2017). When looking at the 95% confidence
interval the odds ratio means there is a 95% likelihood that the true value of the odds
ratio in the population falls between the upper and lower boundary values.
Study Validity
Validity is the extent to which a concept is accurately measure in a quantitative
study (Heale & Twycross, 2015). Validity can be broken down into internal and external.
Internal validity examines whether the manner in which the study was designed,
conducted, and analyzed allows for answers to be truthful when analyzing the research
question within the study (Andrade, 2018). Often internal validity will be used in
experimental and quasi-experimental research studies. Since this research study will not
be experimental or quasi-experimental, I will not need to address the internal validity.
However, external validity examines whether the findings within the study are
generalized to other contexts (Andrade, 2018; Lievens et al., 2019). Data was collected
according to the suggested sample size from the power analysis and then analyzed using
the SPSS program; this reduced the threat of external validity.
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Quantitative research designs also analyze validity through the use of statistical
conclusion validity. Statistical conclusion validity holds when the conclusion of a
research study is found through the use of adequate analysis of the data collected (GarciaPerez, 2012). There are two different types of statistical conclusion validity, Type-I errors
and Type-II errors. A Type-I error happens when the research accepts the alternate
hypothesis and concluding that a relationship exists between variables when there is no
relationship present (Ampatzoglou et al., 2019). On the reverse side, a Type-II error
occurs when the research accepts the null hypothesis, which is saying no relationship
exists, when in reality there is a relationship between the variables (Ampatzoglou et al.,
2019).
Within this research study, I ensured that Type-I and Type-II errors do not occur
by setting the alpha (a) level, or level of statistical significance to 0.05 and the beta (b)
level or statistical power between 0.80 – 0.99. I ensured that my sample size was big
enough to help eliminate the possibility of Type-I or Type-II errors. The sample size in
my study included Class I and Class II railroad in the United States. An a priori
calculation of sample size required an effect size of f = .15, a = .05, and power b = 0.80,
which will require a minimum of 139 in the sample. If the power b is increased to b =
0.99 the sample size would jump to a minimum sample size of 257.
Transition and Summary
Section 2 contained a plan on conducting research pertaining to the determination
of a relationship between operator causal factors, nonoperator causal factors, and the
number of train derailments. In Section 2, I discussed the role of the researcher,
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participants, research methods and design, populations and sampling, ethical research,
instrumentation, data collection and analysis, and the study validity. In Section 2, I
explained why I choose the correlational research design and the binomial logistics
regression analysis for this study. I explained where the data will be collected, and how I
will use Microsoft Excel to download the information and complete data cleaning before
inputting the data into SPSS for analysis. Section 3 will contain the presentation of the
findings, application to professional practice, implications for social change,
recommendations for action, recommendations for further research, reflections, and a
conclusion.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew
members, crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. I
conducted a binominal logistic regression analysis and found nonoperator train
derailment causal factors and number of crew members on duty were significant
predictors in the occurrence of train derailment. The null hypothesis was rejected, and the
alternative hypothesis was accepted. However, visibility, weather, operator causal factors,
both operator and nonoperator causal factors and length of time on duty were not
significant predictors in the occurrence of train derailment.
Presentation of the Findings
In this subsection, I discuss the findings of the analyses of the collected data. I
include the results of testing for statistical assumptions, descriptive analysis, and
inferential analysis conducted to address the central research question and associated
hypotheses. The results of the binomial logistic regression analysis procedures are
included, along with the nature of the relationship between the study variables. I also
present a theoretical discussion on the findings, application to professional practice,
implications for social change, recommendations for actions and further research, and my
reflections.
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Tests of Assumption
There are seven assumptions associated with binomial logistic regression: (a) one
dependent variable that is dichotomous (nominal variable with two outcomes), (b) one or
more independent variables that are continuous or nominal scale, (c) independence of
observations and the categories of the dichotomous dependent variable and all nominal
independent variables should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, (d) bare minimum of
15 cases per independent variable, (e) linear relationship between the continuous
independent variables and the logit transformation of the dependent variable, (f) no
multicollinearity, and (g) no outliers (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
The first three assumptions were met. The fourth assumption of minimum of 15
cases per independent variable was met in all but two instances. The dependent variable
was dichotomous (0 = classified as not a train derailment, 1 = classified as train
derailment). The independent variables includes both continuous and categorical
variables. Number of crew members and crew members length of time on duty were
continuous variables. Train derailment causal factors, visibility, and weather were
categorical variables. The independence of observations assumption was met because
accident cause could only fit under one category. According to the power analysis
completed, the recommended sample size for this study was 139, but all accident within
the calendar year 2019 for Class I and Class II railroads were used in this study, which
totaled 1,396 accidents. There were two instances for sleet and snow where there were
less than 15 cases per independent variable. All other independent variables had more
than 15 cases.
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The assumption of a linear relationship was not met, but this is likely due to the
large sample size; therefore, no adjustments were needed to the study. According to
Laerd (2017), a large sample size can result in a violation of this assumption, and when
this occurs, no adjustments to the analysis are needed. For the assumption of linearity, the
Spearman’s rank-order correlations (see Table 1) were run to examine the relationship
between number of crew members and length of time on duty. These were the only
variables included in the linearity test because they are continuous. The correlation
coefficient between number of crew members and length of time on duty this was .233 (rs
= .233, n = 1,396, p < .001), which shows a weak relationship between the two variables.
Table 1
Linear Relationship Assumption Testing Using Spearman’s rho

Number of Crew
Members

Correlation
Coefficient

Number of Crew
Members
1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

Length of Time on
Duty

Length of Time on
Duty
.233
.000

N

1,396

1,396

Correlation
Coefficient

.233

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

1,396

1,396

The assumption of no multicollinearity was met. Multicollinearity was evaluated
by viewing the collinearity statistics of tolerance and VIF. Since all predictor variables
had a tolerance level higher than .07 and VIF lower than 10 (Table 2), there was no
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violation of the assumption of multicollinearity. The following table shows the tolerance
and VIF for each predictor variable.
Table 2
Multicollinearity Assumption Testing Using Coefficients
Visibility

Tolerance
.996

VIF
1.004

Weather

.996

1.004

Cause Code

.991

1.009

Number of Crew
Members

.947

1.056

Length of Time
on Duty

.954

1.048

The assumption of no outliers was met. To test for outliers, the case wise list was
analyzed when the logistic regression analysis was performed, which showed all cases
had a standard deviation below 2.5, meaning they were not outliers and could be included
in the data set (Laerd Statistics, 2017).
Data Cleaning and Descriptive Analysis
In total, there were 1,609 cases once filtered down to Class I and Class II
railroads. Once filtered down into Class I and Class II railroads, each accident incident
number was analyzed to ensure that there was not a duplicate input or missing
information from the accident report. There were 213 records eliminated due to duplicate
cases and missing data, resulting in 1,396 records for the analysis. To eliminate these
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cases from the datafile, I deleted those lines from the Excel file and did not include them
in the SPSS data file.
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for the frequency of each variable. The
model included 1,396 cases. The data showed 41.3% of the accidents reported occurred
during the day and 65.2% of the accidents occurred during clear weather conditions.
From all accidents reported 45.3% were caused by operator factors and 53.5% were
caused by nonoperator causal factors. Additionally, the data showed that 63.7% of all
accidents occurred when there were only two crew members on duty and 25.3% when
there were three crew members on duty. When looking at length of time on duty, 7.8% of
the time the crew was on duty 3–4 hours. Finally, from all accidents reported, 73.4%
resulted in the occurrence of a train derailment which totals 1,024 cases. All 1,396 total
cases all were considered 100% valid, and there were no missing data.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics—Frequencies
Dawn
Day
Dusk
Dark
Clear
Cloudy
Rain
Fog
Sleet
Snow
Operator Cause
Nonoperator Cause
Both
1 Crew Member
2 Crew Members
3 Crew Members
4 Crew Members
5 Crew Members
0-1 hours
1-2 hours
2-3 hours
3-4 hours
4-5 hours
5-6 hours
6-7 hours
7-8 hours
8-9 hours
9-10 hours
10-11 hours
11-12 hours
12-13 hours
13-14 hours
14-15 hours
15-16 hours
16-17 hours
17-18 hours
18-19 hours
19-20 hours
20-21 hours
21-22 hours
22-23 hours
23-24 hours
27-28 hours
44-45 hours
Not a Train Derailment
Train Derailment
Valid
Missing
Total

N
164
576
146
510
910
336
99
12
5
34
632
747
17
128
889
353
23
3
19
73
93
109
103
83
98
100
75
82
63
57
61
50
50
43
43
30
37
31
41
28
15
10
1
1
372
1024
1,396
0
1,396

Percentage
11.7%
41.3%
10.5%
36.5%
65.2%
24.1%
7.1%
.9%
.4%
2.4%
45.3%
53.5%
1.2%
9.2%
63.7%
25.3%
1.6%
.2%
1.4%
5.2%
6.7%
7.8%
7.4%
5.9%
7.0%
7.2%
5.4%
5.9%
4.5%
4.1%
4.4%
3.6%
3.6%
3.1%
3.1%
2.1%
2.7%
2.2%
2.9%
2.0%
1.1%
0.7%
0.1%
0.1%
26.6%
73.4%
100%
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Inferential Statistics
The analysis of the model fitting test is summarized in Table 4. The independent
variables add statistically significant to the model or at least one independent variable is
statistically significant. The significance value is less than .05; therefore, the null
hypothesis is rejected. A statistically significant difference does exist between train
derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members
length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment.
Table 4
Model Fitting Information
Chi-Square
114.265

df
12

Sig.
.000

Block

114.265

12

.000

Model

114.365

12

.000

Step

Table 5 includes inferential results for the hypotheses. Dummy coding allows
researchers to turn categories into (1) yes or (2) no, when dealing with categorical
variables with more than one level (Laerd Statistics, 2017). From the dummy coding
there will be a reference category that identifies a category of comparison for the other
categories. The reference category makes all interpretations in reference to that category.
For example, using visibility—dawn as the dummy variable and visibility—dark as the
reference, results for that variable showed visibility dark in comparison with train
accidents visibility of dawn. Visibility, weather, and train derailment causal factors were
dummy coded for data analysis in SPSS. For visibility, the variables included in the
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analysis were (a) dawn, (b) day, and (c) dusk. Dark was used as the reference category
for visibility in the logistic regression analysis. Weather included (a) clear, (b) cloudy, (c)
rain, (d) fog, and (e) sleet. Snow was used as the reference category for weather. Finally,
train derailment causal factors were (a) operator causal factor and (b) nonoperator causal
factors. Both operator causal factors and nonoperator causal factors were used as the
reference category for train derailment causal factors.
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Table 5
Inferential Results
B
Visibility
Dawn
Day
Dusk
Weather
Clear
Cloudy
Rain
Fog
Sleet
Cause Factors
Operator Causal
Factors

S.E

Wald

df

p

3
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
2
1

.983
.744
.729
.896
.561
.534
.689
.744
.742
.503
.000
.207

-.068
-.050
-0.29

.209
.145
.224

.248
.165
-.147
.264
-.692

.399
.412
.450
.802
1.033

.630

.500

.168
.107
.120
.017
3.917
.386
.160
.106
.108
.448
93.708
1.592

Nonoperator
Causal Factors

1.871

.504

13.796

1

Number of Crew
Members

.416

.107

15.062

Length of Time on
Duty

.005

.011

-1.291

.681

Constant

Exp(B)

95% CI for
Odds Ratio
Lower Upper

.934
.951
.971

.621
.716
.626

1.406
1.263
1.506

1.281
1.179
.863
1.302
.501

.586
.526
.357
.270
.066

2.802
2.642
2.086
6.269
3.796

1.878

.705

5.001

.000

6.492

2.419

17.419

1

.000

1.516

1.229

1.870

.179

1

.672

1.005

.983

1.027

3.588

1

.058

.275

Note. This table depicts the logistic regression analysis output.
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The p value represents the statistical significance of each independent variable. P
values of less than .05 are accepted as statistically significant, meaning that they are
unlikely to have occurred by chance (Stern, 2016). From the p values in Table 5,
nonoperator causal factors (< .001) and number of crew members (< .001) were
statistically significant predictors for the occurrence of train derailment. All other
predictor variables had p values above .05, which showed that they were not statistically
significant predictors of the occurrence of train derailment. The Exp(B) also informs
researchers of the change in the odds for each increase in one unit of the independent
variable (Laerd Statistics, 2017). From the data, nonoperator causal code (6.494) and
number of crew members (1.516) if increased by one unit increases the odds of a train
derailment occurrence.
The null hypothesis was that there is not a statistically significant relationship
between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members,
crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. The
regression results showed that two of the predictor variables, nonoperator causal factors
and number of crew members on duty, were statistically significant predictors for the
occurrence of train derailment. The other predictor variables, visibility, weather, operator
causal factors, both operator and nonoperator causal factors and length of time on duty,
were not statistically significant predictors of train derailment. Therefore, the null
hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted.
As shown in Table 6, the Pseudo R2 values show the percentage of the dependent
variable that can be predicated by the independent variables. The Pseudo R2 values are
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used to understand how much variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the
model. I used the Cox & Snell measure (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2021),
which indicated that the model with the five independent variables explains 7.9% of the
variance in the dependent variable, occurrence of train derailment. I also used Nagelkerke
measure (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2021), which indicated that the model
with five independent variables explains 11.5% of the variance in the dependent variable,
occurrence of train derailment.
Table 6
Pseudo R-Square
-2 Log likelihood
1504.318

1

Cox & Snell R Square
.079

Nagelkerke R Square
.115

Summary
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather, number of crew
members, crew members length of time on duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. I
collected secondary data from the FRA safety database on train accidents that occurred in
Class I and Class II railroads during the 2019 calendar year. I conducted a binomial
logistic regression analysis using the data from 1,396 train accidents. The overall findings
of this study provided evidence of a statistically significant relationship, x2(12) =
114.265, p < .001. Of the predictor variables, nonoperator causal factors and number of
crew members on duty were statistically significant predictors of the occurrence of train
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derailment. In the following sections, I will discuss these results in relation to existing
literature, and the conclusions and recommendations based on the results.
Theoretical Discussion of Findings
While visibility, weather, operator causal factors, both operator factors, length of
time on duty were not significant in the analysis of this study, nonoperator causal factors
and number of crew members on duty were significant predictors of the occurrence of
train derailment. The results of the study provided insight into the variables that have a
significant impact on the occurrence of train derailments. Previous research can be used
to help illuminate the results of this study. From previous research, 19,261 derailments
were from nonoperator causal factors (Li et al., 2018). Nonoperator causal factors
encompass things that our outside the control on the operator and are listed in Appendix
B of this study. Number of crew members on duty can have impact on the ability for crew
members to observe when other crew members are distracted, and an accident can occur
(Coplen & Sussman, 2000).
Previous studies provided insight into the causes of train derailment or the after
effect of a train derailment and how to improve the occurrence of train derailment
occurring (Hunter-Zaworski, 2017; Underwood & Waterson, 2014; Zhang & Sun, 2019).
Underwood and Waterson used the Swiss cheese model to analyze the Greyrigg train
derailment and realized that poor maintenance along with other factors caused the
derailment to occur. Hunter-Zaworski) completed an analysis on passenger accidents to
understand the safety measures that needed to be in place or updated to ensure passenger
safety. Zhang and Sun analyzed different train derailment risk response strategies to help
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limit the occurrence of train derailment occurrence. From precious research it was also
found that high FRA track classes had lower derailment rates, varying by more than an
order of magnitude (Liu et al., 2017).
Nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members were found to be
statistically significant predictors of the occurrence of train derailment. This aligns with
articles from Hunter-Zaworski, 2017, Underwood & Waterson, 2014, and Zhang & Sun,
2019. The goal was to understand the causes of train derailment or the after effect of a
train derailment and how to improve the occurrence of train derailment occurring. From
the analysis in this study researchers can further understand the main causal factors that
have an effect on the occurrence of train derailment.
Visibility, weather, operator causal factors, both operator factors, and length of
time on duty were not significant predictors in the occurrence of train derailment. This
conflicts with previous research since operator causal factors were predictors in previous
research (Hunter-Zaworski, 2017, Underwood & Waterson, 2014, and Zhang & Sun,
2019). In previous research both operator causal factors and nonoperator causal factors
were analyzed as causes of train derailment but this doctoral study breaks each of these
causal factors out for further analysis.
The theoretical framework for this study was the Swiss cheese model which helps
to show where the holes are that create the scenario for a train derailment to occur (Olson
& Raz, 2021). In this study, the holes that are aligning are nonoperator causal factors and
number of crew members on duty, this can further be expanded if the analysis completed
by Underwood and Waterson (2014). Researchers can use the Swiss cheese model to
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complete further analysis on nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members on
duty to see how it impacted accidents that were caused by these factors.
The Swiss cheese model was created to understand the active failures, latent
failures, and defenses within a system (Reason, 1997). Active failures are unsafe acts by
front-end operators and latent failures are gaps or weaknesses in the system safety
defense. Defenses can be looked at as layers of cheese’ with holes in it and when they
align it created a weakness in the system causing an accident to occur. From this study
nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members are the slices of cheese that are
aligning to create train derailment occurrence. Nonoperator causal factors can fall into the
active or latent failure categories. They can fall into the active failure because there could
be neglect on track maintenance or other organizational failures that are causing the train
derailment. Nonoperator causal factors can be latent because there may be a condition not
known that over time can become active and cause the train derailment to occur. The
number of crew members can fall into the latent failure category because there could be
an issue with scheduling on management and having a lack of personal on duty can cause
issues to not be noticed and a train derailment to occur.
Applications to Professional Practice
The general business problem in this study was that train derailments, sometimes
the results of operator error, have impact on community safety, transportation efficiency,
and organizational cost. The specific business problem was some railway managers do
not understand the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility,
weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and the
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occurrence of train derailment. The most important outcome from this study that railway
managers should deduce is nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members are
important to help limit the occurrence of train derailment.
Railway managers should focus on the nonoperator causal factors that are
increasing the chances for train derailment occurrence. Railway managers could consider
increasing the frequency of track maintenance or switch maintenance or other variables
that fall into the nonoperator causal factor table (Appendix B). Environmental conditions
fall into the nonoperator causal factor area; therefore, railway managers could look at
potential weather patterns and make decisions about whether to send the crew out if there
will be a potential environmental issue.
Railway managers should also consider the number of crew members that are on a
train at a time. The number of crew members was found to significantly impact the
occurrence of train derailment. Specifically, train derailments were less likely to occur if
there were a higher number of crew members, as compared to a lower number of crew
members. Railway managers can investigate how crews are being managed and if there is
a need to increase the crew members that are on duty. Limiting the number of crew
members can cause potential causal factors to not be noticed, which could lead to
derailment.
The Swiss cheese model analyzes active failures, latent failures, and defenses
within a system that cause an accident to occur. Railway managers could have analyses
completed to understand the specific causal factors that have a higher impact on their
operations and find the potential solutions to correct the errors before another derailment
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occurs (Li et al., 2019). Analysis on number of crew members can help railway managers
with allocation of resources to help limit the occurrence of train derailment. There could
be the potential for lack of crew members available to be on duty at the time a train is
moving cars, which could cause a potential train derailment. When there are fewer crew
members on duty, there are things that can be missed by the crew that can help prevent
train derailments from occurring. The number of crew members on duty could also be
indicative of other factors causing derailment that are not mentioned in the accident
reports. Expanding the content of the accident reports could lead to a better understanding
of these factors. Further analysis from railway managers will help understand the active
failures, latent failures, and defense.
Implications for Social Change
This study has numerous implications for social change. This study provided an
understanding of the relative importance of nonoperator causal factors and the number of
crew members. Understanding the nonoperator causal factors and the number of crew
members can help management to limit the occurrence of train derailment. Management
can have further analysis completed to understand the overall impact that nonoperator
causal factors have on their rail line. Such analyses can help management to allocate the
correct resources and not limit the number of crew members that are on duty at one point
in time.
These results may also help railway mangers to understand the unforeseen
accident causal factors for train derailments. While there are operator and nonoperator
causal factors from this study it was found that nonoperator causal factors have a
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significant impact on the occurrence of train derailments. Railway managers can take this
information and understand how the nonoperator causal factors (a) track, roadbed, and
structure, (b) signal and communication, (c) mechanical and electrical failures, (d)
miscellaneous causes not otherwise listed are causing their train derailment numbers to
increase. This information can also help management to understand the areas that might
need improvement with track maintenance, switch maintenance, or environment
condition pre planning prior to sending the team out on the tracks. These results can help
management to understand how limiting the crew members can increase their chances of
train derailment occurrence.
These results may also help everyone to understand the importance of train
derailment causal factors which may help improve the safety measures taken during and
after a train derailment. When a train derailment occurs, operators are required to
complete a train accident report that details what occurred to allow the train derailment to
happen. In this study, I found that nonoperator causal factors and number of crew
members were significantly impacting the occurrence of train derailments. This
information can help operators to understand what is causing the increased likelihood for
a train derailment. Allowing operators to understand this information can help them to
know the common causal factors that occur and to be aware of these before they could
potentially happen to the operator. These results also allow the operator to understand the
correct safety measures to take during and after the train derailment when reporting to
management and the FRA through the accident report documentations.
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Disbursing this information to the community will allow railway managers to
analyze the causal factors for information to disseminate to the community on train
derailment safety precautions. These results will allow for management to tell the
community when track maintenance is being completed or when a potential derailment
occurred and if anything, harmful was put out into the community. The results can also
bring awareness to the areas in the community where train accidents are likely to occur.
This information will also help with disaster prevention to help the community
understand factors that can increase the chances of train derailment occurrence from
outside causal factors.
Recommendations for Action
Factors that impacted the occurrence of train derailments were nonoperator causal
factors and number of crew members. Starting at the top level, managers need to
understand within their organization how accidents are occurring and the factors that are
impacting the occurrence of accidents. In this study, I found that nonoperator causal
factors and number of crew members were significantly impacting the occurrence of train
derailments. This information helps managers to understand what is causing an accident
to occur within their organization and how to further decrease the likelihood of accident
occurrence. Managers and business leaders would be wise to understand the causal
factors that are causing the occurrence of train derailment to increase and also how to
limit these factors, in order to decrease the number of train derailments.
I used the Cox & Snell measure (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2021),
which indicated that the model with the five independent variables explains 7.9% of the
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variance in the dependent variable, occurrence of train derailment. I also used Nagelkerke
measure (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2021), which indicated that the model
with five independent variables explains 11.5% of the variance in the dependent variable,
occurrence of train derailment. Further research could be done to include more
independent variables, which might result in a model that has a higher R2 value. There
are multiple factors listed on the train accident reporting document that other researchers
could select different factors on how it affects the occurrence of train derailment.
The theoretical framework for this study was the Swiss cheese model (Olson &
Raz, 2021). Nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members can be looked at as
a piece of cheese and when their holes align correctly, they increase the likelihood of
train derailment occurrence. The Swiss cheese model helped to show how active failures,
latent failures, and defenses are important for a railway manger to understand within their
operations system (Seshia et al., 2017). Railway managers need to understand how
nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members are the pieces of cheese that are
lining up to increase their changes of train derailment occurrence on their railway.
Railway managers need to understand how these factors are impacting the
occurrence of train derailment because it can decrease the stress that operators are feeling
when a derailment occurs. When a derailment occurs, it can cause stress on the operator
and increase their chances of repeating a train derailment. Since nonoperator causal
factors and number of crew member were found statistically significant on the occurrence
of train derailment, understanding the impact of these factors can also be important when
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railway managers are selecting crew members to ensure that everyone is safe and the
chances of train derailment occurrence of decreased.
Managers may be reluctant to increase the number of crew members on duty at
one time but doing so can help to decrease the occurrence of train derailment. When the
crew size is increased, it may help every operator to notice potential causal factors before
the train derailment can occur. Increasing the crew member size may also help to reduce
the potential stress from the crew and decrease the likelihood of train derailment
occurrence.
The results from this study will be distributed through the publication in the
ProQuest dissertation database. I plan to reach out to railways to see if they are interested
in understanding the data that was produced from this study to share this information with
potential railway managers or business-related managers in the railway industry. There is
the potential to also present this information at any industry conference to see if analysis
can be completed in other industries.
Recommendations for Further Research
The assumptions, limitations, and delimitations provide ample avenues to build
upon the results. One limitation was that there are only two sections for causal code entry
and there might be more than just primary causal code and contributing causal code that
made the train derailment occur. When an accident occurs, operators are required to
report this information on an accident form. When selecting the causal code for the
accident the operator can select a primary and contributing causal code. Future
researchers could embed themselves in a railway company and looking at the accident
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reports that are completed and asking the operator is there were more contributing factors
than just two.
Another limitation was there are potentially additional causes that are not
adequately captured by the list of options within the database. Appendix B lists all the
potential operator and nonoperator causal factors that can be selected by the operators
when completed the accident report. There could be potential accident causal factors not
reflected. Future researchers could complete analysis on the individual factors and if
there is potentially any missing that could be contributing to the accident occurrence.
The final limitation is that all independent variables for this study were entered by
the accident recorder and incorrect information was not imputed. Since this information
is manually inputted into the system there is a chance for the data to be incorrect which
can change the outcome of a study. A future researcher could investigate the potential of
an online system for accident recording where the operator will input the information and
it could potentially decrease the change of incorrect data input.
There are also methodological implications for future research. As this study was
quantitative, a qualitative research study could aid in understand how managers process
the information from train accidents. A qualitative study could provide further insight
into the variables to see if there are any outside forces that impact the occurrence of train
derailment. Along with these researchers could complete this study in different industries
to see how multiple variables impact the occurrence of accidents. By comparing and
contrasting industries, researchers can make better recommendations for specific
organizations. This study focused on train derailment causal factors, visibility, weather,
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number of crew members, and crew members length of time on duty results may be
different if other variables are selected from the railway accident reporting record.
Lastly, there is room for theoretical improvement. I used the Swiss cheese model
to show how nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members where the slice of
cheese lining up to cause an increased likelihood of train derailment occurrence but there
are other accident theories that could be used for this analysis. Research using other
theoretical frameworks might result in a different outcome.
Reflections
The Walden University doctoral study process had been challenging and
rewarding. I learned a lot about myself throughout the whole process. Early in my
journey, I was very motivated but nervous about how I would progress through the
program. After my first residency I was worried that I would not know what to write
about and then began thinking about passions that I had, which led me to my passion for
the railroad industry. I have thoroughly enjoyed the interactions that I had with faculty,
staff, and students while attending Walden University. Eventually, I began to find the
balance between writing my study, personal life, and my full-time professional career.
Working in the logistic field drove me to better understand how business managers have
impact within their company. While in class and at residency I have found lifelong
friends and motivation for completing this journey together. This doctoral study journey
has helped to strengthen my research skills and to think outside the box when completing
research analysis.

95
This journey has also allowed me to expand my knowledge on SPSS, which is
one of the reasons that I completed a quantitative study. I expanded my knowledge on
quantitative and qualitative research methods which will help me when wanting to
complete analysis on different things in my professional career. While quantitative
studies are not popular and most of my classmates were completing qualitative studies, it
was the best option for me because it expanded my knowledge and expanded my
experience while at Walden University. I have learned so much from my doctoral chair
and second committee member during this journey and I will be grateful for this
experience the rest of my life. I look forward to future researching opportunities and
expanding my research articles.
Conclusion
The general business problem was that train derailments, sometimes the results of
operator error, have an impact on community safety, transportation efficiency, and
organizational cost. The specific business problem was that some railway managers do
not understand the relationship between train derailment causal factors, visibility,
weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on duty, and the
occurrence of train derailment. To address this problem, the purpose of this quantitative
correlational study was to examine the relationship between train derailment causal
factors, visibility, weather, number of crew members, crew members length of time on
duty, and the occurrence of train derailment. The theoretical framework for this study
was James Reason’s (1987) Swiss cheese model. I conducted this study to address the
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research question and provide practical information about how railway managers can use
this information to decrease their likelihood of train derailment.
The overall findings of this study provided evidence of statistically significant
relationships between nonoperator causal factors and number of crew members on the
occurrence of train derailment. This study offered railway managers specific implications
from variables studied and how they can use this information to better understand and
prevent train derailments, because they understand the relative importance of the factors
input on the potential outcomes. Lastly, there are plenty of opportunities for future
research including studying other industries, using a qualitative approach, and by using
other theories as the framework for a future study. Further research is important because
train derailment has an impact on community safety, transportation efficiency, and
organizational cost. Therefore, determining what variables increase train derailment
occurrence allows railway managers to help reduce the frequency of train derailment
occurrences within the railroad industry and save lives.
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Appendix A: Train Derailment Reporting
Train derailments occur when on-track equipment depart the rail for reasons other
than collision, explosion, and rail crossing impact (Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA], 2019). All derailments, regardless of whether there is damage caused or not, are
reported reporting on a Form FRA F 6180.97 – Initial Rail Equipment Accident/Incident
Record which includes important information regarding the incident (see Figure A1).
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Figure A1
Form FRA F 6180.97

Note. From Federal Railroad Administration, 2019.
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Depending on the initial information being reported, further forms may need to be
completed and attached to a more detailed report for input into the FRA safety website. If
the damage occurring during the derailment is more than the current threshold for the
current year, then further information is reported on Form FRA F 6180.54 – Rail
Equipment Accident/Incident Report (see Figure A2). For calendar year 2017 and
beyond, the threshold was set at $10,700. On this form there are 55 fields that all need to
be completed each providing important details about the event that occurred. With
respect to this doctoral study the most important fields are as follows: seven (Type of
Accident/Incident, 18 (Visibility), 19 (Weather), 22 (FRA Track Class), 38 (Primary
Cause Code), 39 (Contributing Cause Code), 40-43 (Number of Crew Members), and 44
& 45 (Length of Time on Duty).
Field 7 (Type of Accident/Incident) is important because code 1 is applicable to
derailment which is the area of interest for this doctoral study. All other codes in this
field will be coded for accidents other than train derailment. Also, this code will help to
filter through all the accidents that are reported into the FRA Safety website and exported
into an excel file for analysis. Field 18 (Visibility) will help to understand the conditions
when the derailments occurred. Field 19 (Weather) will help to understand the weather
that was occurring when the train derailment happened. Field 22 (FRA Track Class) will
help to be able to ensure that only Class I and Class II railroad accidents are being
analyzed. Field 38 (Primary Cause Code) and field 39 (Contributing Cause Code) will
help with breaking the causal codes into train derailment causal codes (human or
nonhuman). Field 40-43 (Number of Crew Members) will help to understand the number
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of crew members that were working when the train derailment occurred. Finally, field 44
and 45 (Length of Time on Duty) will show the amount of time that the crew members
were on duty and the impact it have on the occurrence of train accidents.
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Figure A2
Form FRA F 6180.54

Note. From Federal Railroad Administration, 2019.
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Completing these forms is important for companies because they allow
management to understand what occurred at the time of the accident. When a train
derailment occurs, there could be multiple things effected within the company because of
the cost associated with train derailments. Along with this, depending on what the
employee was hauling at the time of the derailment, local law enforcement might need to
be called in if there was a hazardous material being transported. Safety measures are
directly tied into these reports because the FRA safety office will use these forms to
understand where the incident occurred, what occurred, and what was the contributing
factor to the occurrence of the accident.
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Appendix B: Operator and Nonoperator Causal Codes
Table B1
Operator Causal Factors—1 in SPSS Data File
Brakes, Use of
Employee
Physical
Condition

Applicable Codes
H008, H017, H018, H019, H020, H021, H022, H025, H099
H101, H102, H103, H104, H099

Flagging, Fixed,
Hand and Radio
Signals

H201, H202, H205, H206, H207, H208, H209, H210, H211, H212, H217,
H218, H219, H220, H221, H222, H299

General Switching
Rules

H301, H302, H303, H304, H305, H306, H307, H308, H309, H310, H311,
H312, H313, H314, H315, H316, H317, H318, H399

Main Track
Authority
Train
Handling/Train
Makeup

H401, H402, H403, H404, H405, H406, H499
H501, H502, H503, H504, H505, H506, H507, H508, H509, H510, H511,
H512, H513, H514, H515, H516, H517, H518, H619, H520, H521, H522,
H523, H524, H525, H526, H599

Speed
H601, H602, H603, H604, H605, H606, H607, H699
Switches, Use of
H701, H702, H703, H704, H705, H706, H707, H799
Cab Signals
H821, H822, H823, H824, H899
Miscellaneous
H991, H992, H993, H994, H99A, H99B, H99C, H99D, H99E, H995, H996,
H997, H999
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Table B2
Nonoperator Causal Factors—0 in SPSS Data File
Roadbed

Applicable Codes
T001, T002, T099

Track Geometry

T101, T102, T03, T104, T105, T106, T107, T108, T109, T110, T111, T12,
T113, T199

Rail, Joint Bar and Rail
Anchoring

T201, T202, T203, T204, T205, T206, T207, T208, T210, T211, T212,
T213, T214, T215, T216, T217, T218, T219, T220, T221, T222, T223,
T224, T299

Frogs, Switches and Track
Appliances

T301, T302, T303, T303, T305, T306, T307, T308, T309, T310, T311,
T312, T313, T314, T315, T316, T317, T318, T319, T399

Other Way and Structures

T401, T402, T403, T404, T499

Signal and Communication

S001, S002, S003, S004, S005, S006, S007, S008, S009, S010, S011, S012,
S013, S014, S015, S016, S099, S101, S102, S103, S104

Brakes

E00C, E00L, E01C, E01L, E02C, E02L, E03C, E03L, E04C, E04L, E05C,
E05L, E06C, E06L, E07C, E07L, E08C, E08L, E0HC, E0HL, E09C, E09L,
E10L

Trailer or Container or Flatcar

E11C, E12C, E13C, E19C

Body

E20C, E20L, E21C, E21L, E22C, E22L, E23C, E23L, E24C, E24L, E25C,
E25L, E26C, E26L, E27C, E27L, E29C, E29L

Coupler and Draft System

E30C, E30L, E31C, E31L, E32C, E32L, E33C, E33L, E34C, E34L, E35C,
E35L, E36C, E36L, E37C, E37L, E39C, E39L

Truck Components

E40C, E40L, E41C, E41L, E42C, E42L, E43C, E43L, E44C, E44L, E45C,
E45L, E46C, E4AC, E4BC, E46L, E47C, E47L, E48C, E48L, E4TC, E4TL,
E49C

Axles and Journal Bearings

E51C, E51L, E52C, E52L, E53C, E53L, E54C, E54L, E55C, E55L, E59C,
E59L

Wheels

E60C, E60L, E61C, E61L, E62C, E62L, E63C, E63L, E64C, E64L, E65C,
E65L, E66C, E66L, E67C, E67L, E68C, E68L, E6AC, E6AL, E69C, E69L

Locomotives

E70L, E71L, E72L, E73L, E74L, E75L, E76L, E77L, E78L, E7AL, E7BL,
E79L

Doors

E80C, E81C, E82C, E83C, E84C, E85C, E856C, E89C

General Mechanical and
Electric Failures

E99C, E99L

Environmental Conditions

M101, M102, M103, M104, M105, M199

Loading Procedures

M201, M202, M203, M204, M206, M207, M208, M299

Unusual Operational
Situations

M401, M402, M403, M404, M405, M406, M407, M408, M409, M410,
M411

Other Miscellaneous

M501, M502, M503, M504, M505, M506, M507, M509, M510, M599
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Appendix C: Data Analysis Coding

Dawn

Visibility
0

Day

1

Dusk

2

Dark

3

Clear

Weather
0

Cloudy

1

Rain

2

Fog

3

Sleet

4

Snow

5
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Appendix D: G*Power Analysis
Figure D1
G*Power 80% Power Plot
F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model. R² deviation from zero
Number of predictors = 15. α err prob = 0.05. Effect size f² = 0.15

Total sample size

200

150
Effect size f²
100

= 0.15

50

0
0.6

0.65
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0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

Power (1-β err prob)

Figure D2
G*Power 99% Power Plot
F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model. R² deviation from zero
Number of predictors = 15. α err prob = 0.05. Effect size f² = 0.15
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Appendix E: Data Analysis File

